Seriously? I almost feel bad for what I’m about to do here. So on the one hand you’re speaking about a God that is unchanging and has no likeness (Jeremiah 10:6, Isaiah 46:9). Then later you talk about the divine nature, which is infinite and unchanging, adopting the nature of humanity, and thus the divine nature having at some point an end to its old nature without humanity and therefore can’t really be called infinite and unchanging anymore. Then you assert that in taking up the nature of humanity, it included everything that comes with it including being finite, all the while having the divine nature maintaining its infinity. — Mr. Mohamed Ghilan

I take it he’s not a fan.

The above is an extract from the discussion that is happening here. I have just given my wonderful Triangle-Box analogy and to this Mr. Ghilan has claimed that God would still be undergoing change; ergo Christians have just violated the law of non-contradiction (in reference to the Hypostatic Union). We should note that at this moment, the individual has not in fact given any argument for how this is the case nor has he clarified what manner of change he is referring to: whether intrinsic or extrinsic (i.e. a Cambridge change). Within the following we will assume that he is against both forms of change.

Defining Change:

That said, at this point it would prove wise to actually set out some definitions for if such isn’t done then, as Mr. Ghilan has kindly pointed out earlier, “we risk talking past one another.” With that in mind, we must first define what we mean by change.

Change can concisely be defined as the process of becoming different. Now there are actually two types of change and what the aforementioned definition primarily has in view is intrinsic change. Intrinsic Change is a change in being (that is to say essence/nature etc.)—a definitive change in one’s ontology. This is the type we most often think about when we speaking of a thing undergoing change. The second form of change is an extrinsic change (i.e. Cambridge change) and this form of change deals with change that is actualized outside of a person, place or thing. Here is an example of what is meant by a cambridge change (compliments of wikipedia):

Suppose that at t1, person A is 180cm tall and person B is 175cm tall, while at time t2 A is still 180cm tall but B has grown to be 185cm tall. Since the predicate `is taller than B’ is true of A at t1 but not true of A at t2, A has changed according to the Cambridge change definition of “change”—he has gone from being taller than B to not being taller than B.

Intuitively, however, it is only person B, and not person A, who has changed: B has grown by 10cm, but A has stayed the same. This problem with Cambridge changes is usually thought to call for a distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic, or natural and non-natural, properties. Given such a distinction, it is possible to define “real” change by requiring that the predicate involved express an intrinsic property, like being 175cm tall, rather than an extrinsic property, like being taller than B.

Now the above certainly does do a better job in defining extrinsic change than my—in retrospect—pathetic attempt. Now why is all of this at all important? Well because the Abrahamic religions hold it as an article of faith that God is incapable of change and yet of these, Christianity quite famously holds that this very same unchanging God did in fact assume a human nature some two thousand years ago. Is this a violation of logic? The Christian says no.

Defining the Immutability of God:

When it is said that God cannot change, we simply mean to say that God cannot fail to possess his great-making attributes; that is, that his nature cannot be altered. These qualities are inherent in his nature and as such, God as he is in himself (i.e. intrinsically), cannot undergo any alteration. Now I have placed the phrase, “as he is in himself” in italics partly because this will go a long way in explaining the Christian understanding and also because this is completely true, and far more precise than the vague phrase, “God does not change.” Once again, if God cannot lose his divine attributes, and if these attributes are inherent in the nature of God, then it follows that God cannot experience any change within the divine essence (for by listing God’s various attributes what we really are enumerating is what God truly is/possesses). As such, the phrase “as he is in himself” should be understood as “the divine essence”. I trust that so far, nothing I have said is contentious and if this is the case, then so far, we can list the following as that which has been agreed upon:

1. God does not change.
2. In the above point, what we mean by ‘God’, is “the divine nature” and what we mean by ‘change’, is “fail to possess the attributes inherent in the divine nature.”*

* If it should happen that one finds qualms with the above wording, particularly the part about the word ‘God’ really referring to the divine nature/the divine attributes, then I would remind them to think about what is meant by the word ‘change.’

I certainly do understand that I am repeating myself yet such is the case when one seeks to make a logical argument. They must make certain that all the premises are explained to the best of one’s ability and God knows, I would not have needed to write this post if I had not rushed through my first response. Luckily for us, we have in fact accomplished much and in breaking down what is really meant by the teaching of the immutability of God, we have gone a long way in demonstrating how the Muslim fails to grasp the intricacies of logic when it comes to decrying the Hypostatic Union as contrary to logic.

Of the Hypostatic Union:

The Hypostatic Union posits that the Son took on a human nature aside from his divine nature–such that there now resided two conflicting natures within the person that is Christ Jesus. As can be seen from Mr. Mohamed Ghilan’s comment, he claims that such would introduce change (though he doesn’t explicitly mention what type of change he has in view) within the being of God. Assuming that what he has in mind is inherent change within the divine nature, then our first objection would be that such a claim is blatantly false. By definition, to take on a second nature does not imply changing the first nature at all. This can be readily seen from my, much-maligned, analogy of the Triangle-Box:

Keeping in line with my wish for simplicity, let us imagine a triangle. Now we all know the nature of a triangle i.e. it’s attributes, the things that make a triangle a triangle as opposed to a rectangle or circle. Good. Now let us at this point imagine a box. Once more we know what is the nature of a box and furthermore, we are also aware that the nature of a box is in direct contradiction to the nature of a triangle. Now suppose that we were to place the triangle within the box, would we then have a confusion, a mixing, an intermingling of the two essences/natures? No, we would possess one unit (the Triangle-Box if you would like) with the essences of both objects intact.

The triangle would not cease to be a triangle and neither would the box cease to be a box—on the contrary we would now have a unit that possesses in its being the very attributes of both in that it is not half a box and half a triangle but rather a full (perfect) triangle and a full (perfect) box. A veritable Triangle-Box, wherein the unit is one but the essences are two.

In just the same manner does the Christian speak of God becoming man. God did not cease being God, he did not convert the divine essence into a human essence; instead he took on a second nature aside from his divine nature. As such in the unit that is the individual, Christ Jesus, there are two natures with contradicting attributes simultaneously present. As with the Triangle-Box, Jesus can claim the otherwise mutually exclusive prerogatives that come with each nature because of them being simultaneously existent in his being. Such that he can increase in knowledge as man, but always have known all things as God. Such that he can pray to the Father as man, yet have no need to do so as God. Such that should he will it, he is able to give his life unto death as man, and yet death never having any power or hold over him as God.

He does everything as the God-Man—mystery upon mystery. In short, He is both three-sided and four-sided at the same time.

Now logic dictates that to take on a second nature need not mean intrinsically changing the first. Furthermore, logic also stipulates that contradictory qualities can in fact be true of a single object (as has been shown in my previous post, and to which Mr. Ghilan subsequently agreed) as long as the referent is not the same thing. At this time, I am reminded of a wonderful thing that Mr. Ghilan had said:

Here is the problem with your example of the divided paper: you wouldn’t say that it’s black and not black at the same time when you’re referring to the paper as a whole. Instead, you would say it’s a black AND WHITE paper.

Nevermind the fact that he has misunderstood both myself and logic in the above (for even when speaking of the paper as a whole, one can never get away from speaking of its parts. As such, to call something ‘black and white’ would mean that this thing is black and not black at the same time for we know that ‘white’—among other things—means ‘not black’. ) the important thing we have here is that we find ourselves with a tacit admission that a single unit (in this case the sheet of paper) can possess in it’s being, two contradictory natures (that is, whiteness and blackness) simultaneously. We also see the above truth in my Triangle-Box example. We have a single unit (the triangle-box) which perfectly and fully possesses the contradictory natures of a triangle and a box within its being. These are indeed basic principles of logic.

Miscellaneous Objections:

I seem to have overlooked something and so before it is claimed that I have wilfully ignored his point, let us deal with it now:

So let me get this straight, having two things, whole in nature, but inside each other without a mixing/intermingling of the two essences/natures is what God is. How is your box/triangle example any different from the example of a lady who is 8-months pregnant? There is a whole being inside of her that is part of her that aside from genetic resemblance is not taking all her qualities on. They’re 2 in 1. You’re still finding yourself forced to make silly analogies to explain an illogical and incoherent theology. Moreover, you’re violating your assertion from your Bible that there is no one like God. — Mr. Mohamed Ghilan

I must confess that I’m having troubling seeing his point in the above. Is Mr. Ghilan asserting that there are two human natures within the woman? If so then this only goes to show that this individual is dealing with things he does not understand. No matter how many children a pregnant woman has within her, all these participate within the single human nature—i.e. humanity. Currently there exist some 7 billion people on the planet and yet what we have are not 7 billion human natures, but rather 7 billion participants within the single human nature.

Mr. Ghilan’s problem is that he doesn’t seem to know the difference between a person and a nature/essence. A person is, “who one is”, and a nature is “what one is.” As such, unlike with my Triangle-Box example (or the Hypostatic Union for that matter), we do not find ourselves with a case of two different essences/natures subsisting within one unit/being, but merely one nature (which incidentally is shared by both the mother and her child). Yet what exactly does the matter of the pregnant woman have to do with my point? From what I can make of the nonsense above, the author mistakenly thinks that I’m trying to say that nothing is vaguely resembling to God (as such he brings up the matter of the pregnant woman as some sort of, in hindsight, unsuccessful rebuttal) and this is not the case (as I he certainly knows for I had explicitly said as much in my earlier response to him). I trust that this was a simple mistake on his part instead of willful deception.

Regarding your analogy, it is in fact ridiculous. You’re putting an entity within another then claiming they are one because they’re inside each other. I fail to see how that logically follows. — Ibid.

Again I must sincerely ask the Muslim to stop embarrassing himself. To begin with, an entity is a being and as such the word cannot be used to speak of natures but let us ignore this and assume that this is merely an oversight on the part of Mr. Ghilan. Furthermore, I am not in fact claiming that the two natures become one. I would sincerely like to ask where at all this individual gets such an idea from. Can he quote me to such an effect? What about the fact that I quite explicitly state that we really do have two natures and not one? Recall: “Now suppose that we were to place the triangle within the box, would we then have a confusion, a mixing, an intermingling of the two essences/natures? No, we would possess one unit (the Triangle-Box if you would like) with the essences of both objects intact. [...] As such in the unit that is the individual, Christ Jesus, there are two natures with contradicting attributes simultaneously present. As with the Triangle-Box, Jesus can claim the otherwise mutually exclusive prerogatives that come with each nature because of them being simultaneously existent in his being.” And I could go on but suffice to say that my replies to Mr. Ghilan have been replete with explicit statements to the effect that the two natures do not suddenly become one nature. This is not only logically sound but it also steers clear of implying the Monophysite heresy. I certainly don’t know how I could have made myself any clearer and yet the odd thing here is that earlier in his reply, Mr. Ghilan admits himself to be quite aware of the fact that we are always dealing with two natures and not one:

“So let me get this straight, having two things, whole in nature, but inside each other without a mixing/intermingling of the two essences/natures is what God is. How is your box/triangle example any different from the example of a lady who is 8-months pregnant? There is a whole being inside of her that is part of her that aside from genetic resemblance is not taking all her qualities on.”

In the above the author quite clearly speaks of two distinct natures! How then does he seemingly forget all about this later on? I certainly am not omniscient but at present must understand his claim as simple deception to save face before his readership.

If Jesus Christ was just a representation of a human quality that God took upon Himself, then it’s more appropriate to say that the box took to itself a new color. Moreover, your analogy does represent an inherent change in the divine essence in that you can no longer speak of an empty box, but a box-triangle if you would like to refer to it as a single unit, or just speak of it as two separate units; a box AND a triangle. — Mr. Ghilan

Notice how once again the individual displays his misunderstanding of the analogy. If one were to read the Triangle-Box example carefully, it would readily become apparent that the divine nature in this example is the triangle and not the box! We start with a triangle and then add a box to it just as the divine second person of the Trinity assumed a human nature later on at some point in time. The issue really is quite clear. If then the divine nature really is referring to the triangle, then the above objection doesn’t hold up. Also, Mr. Ghilan now wants to present us with a cambridge change, and imply that such is an inherent change. An inherent change within the divine nature would imply that it has lost some of its attributes and we are still waiting for proof that such is the case. What the author has in view in the above, is merely a change of title. In becoming man, the divine son gained the title of theanthropos—the God-man just as in becoming one unit the triangle gained the title of Triangle-box. This is strictly a change in one’s title (i.e. assuming a new relationship) and is not representative of an inherent change. If such weren’t true, then the title that God assumed in creating the world (that being the titles of creator and sustainer) would also imply an inherent change in God’s nature (for he did not possess the title of creator before creating the world just as one does not possess the title of husband until one is married) yet Muslims don’t claim this. Please, let us give rest to self-serving arguments.

Moreover, if we were to apply the proposition of the Trinity onto your analogy, both the box and triangle must share the all too important quality of divinity, otherwise it would be crazy for you to be worshipping Jesus Christ. — Ibid.

At this point we are introduced to, perhaps, the most inane statement so far. The simple answer is no, the human nature does not need to become divine so that one can worship Jesus Christ. God is worshipped for his divine nature: for being our creator, our sustainer, for being perfect as he is in himself, for loving us and taking care of us, for saving us from sin etc. all these are still true of the Son even as he is now the God-man. Christ is worshipped for his divine nature and not for his humanity, simple as that.

So either we speak of the box AND triangle being both equally divine, which is preposterous because that would mean we have two Gods, or we speak of a box-triangle that is wholly divine, which means that neither an empty box nor a lone triangle can be divine on their own. Basically, you can’t have your cake and eat it too. — Ibid.

It would seem that the author is having a hard time understanding the logic and so let us try to make things as simple as possible for him. I will reproduce the author’s words here while replacing the word ‘divine’ with ‘three-sided’ and the word ‘God’ with ‘triangle’. In so doing, we will once again see how much trouble the general Muslim position has with logic: “So either we speak of the box AND triangle being both equally [three-sided], which is preposterous because that would mean we have two [triangles], or we speak of a box-triangle that is wholly [three-sided], which means that neither an empty box nor a lone triangle can be [three-sided] on their own. Basically, you can’t have your cake and eat it too.”

At times I find myself simply astounded by the level of ignorance that Mr. Ghilan displays. Look how vacuous and ridiculous his objection becomes when we keep things simple and remove ourselves from loaded words such as divine nature, human nature etc. The reality is that when speaking of the unit that is the Triangle-Box (or the God-man), we can in fact say that this unit is three-sided (or divine). When we speak of an individual nature within this unit, we can only say that the triangle (the divine nature) is three-sided (divine). It is however in virtue of the unit, the Triangle-Box (the God-man), possessing three-sidedness (divinity) as an attribute, that we can at all speak of it having three sides (having divinity; being God). In short, we speak of the Triangle-box (the God-man) being three-sided or four-sided (divine or human) in reference to a specific nature. Hey, doesn’t this sound a lot like the very thing Mr. Ghilan admitted to be true of a sheet of paper in the following:

Here is the problem with your example of the divided paper: you wouldn’t say that it’s black and not black at the same time when you’re referring to the paper as a whole. Instead, you would say it’s a black AND WHITE paper, which is different than saying it’s black and not black. The former would add a second property to the paper, while the latter negates the very quality it affirms. If you’re going to speak about each side, you would have to indicate whether the side is black OR white.

Here again is proof for my claim that the Muslim ought to be learning logic at the knee of the Christian. For when we pick apart their arguments we find that they were but smoke and mirrors. Truly, Mr. Ghilan never ceases to amaze me.

So where then does this leave our would-be authority on logic? Well although Mr. Ghilan certainly couldn’t claim—well let me rephrase that: although Mr. Ghilan certainly couldn’t prove through reason that an inherent change within the divine nature must have occurred (such that God had lost any of his perfections) he could still in fact claim that even extrinsic change is denied of God.

Such a statement would only furthermore accentuate the desperate situation that the Muslim now finds himself in seeing as extrinsic change, for one thing, has to do with a change in relation between two things. Just as the Hypostatic Union is merely a cambridge change where all that changes is the relation between the divine nature and the human nature (these natures now being united—not diluted nor mixed together to form a hybrid—within the unit/person that is Jesus Christ) so is God’s relation as Creator and Sustainer of the world an example of an extrinsic change. Yes, post creation God did come into a new relationship that he did not previously possess (that of being the sustainer of the world) for creation did not yet exist and as such there was nothing to sustain. This however does not mean that any inherent change has taken place within the divine nature but rather merely an extrinsic change.

Now, the Christian is not asking the Muslim to believe that God really did assume a human nature (though this certainly would be for the best, especially if one cares at all for their eternal soul), we are merely pleading with them to cease making flagrantly erroneous claims about the Hypostatic Union being illogical. Such claims are a clear abuse of logic and, quite frankly, embarrassing.

For the Muslim: a Puzzle

Now we understand that according to Islam, it is impossible for God to enter his creation because how could the infinite become finite so as to enter his creation, because if he were to take on the properties of his creation, he would cease to be God, et cetera, et cetera (might one say, yada, yada, yada?). If such is the case, could Muslims explain this (please read the section in red)?

It clearly says that Allah will take on a shape. Now a shape consists of something which is constrained by certain dimensions; these being length, width, height and so forth. Furthermore, we understand that length, width, height refer to area/space and such did not always exist. They are a creation of Allah. If then Allah can take on a shape (i.e. limit himself to certain dimensions) and as such exhibit the properties of what he has created (i.e. area/space) then has he changed the divine nature? Clearly Allah has just changed from how he existed before having created anything, to taking on the very properties of his creation and if any change in God must mean an inherent change in the divine nature then this must mean that Allah too is guilty of losing his divine attributes. Now of course Muslims will not like this but how will they explain away those clear statements by their Prophet?

If the divine nature does not in fact change, then Allah must actually momentarily take on some other nature/properties (in this particular case: dimension—which is actually an aspect of his creation: space) while still possessing the divine nature. Hmm, now what does this sound like? Muslims, could you please give us Christians a logical explanation for this apparent contradiction?

Of course Muslims won’t be able to come up with a response—other than perhaps, waxing poetic about the esoteric nature of hadiths and how these can often be unclear, or how you need to be able to read Arabic to understand what is really being said, or something equally as ridiculous—seeing as it is either the case that Allah does not change at all (and as such Muhammad is a liar), or he can assume a certain shape (and as such exhibit properties of his creation) without this impinging on his divine qualities.

Addendum:

Divine nature. Box-triangle analogies. Contradictions being accepted as logical. Mental gymnastics that deserve an Olympics gold medal. [...] I’ll leave it to the readers to determine who “refuted” who. I’m convinced that I’ve deconstructed your so-called arguments and shown them to be weak enough to be discarded. — Mr. Mohamed Ghilan

Essentially, such is the response to the argument I have maintained above (I certainly encourage the reader to read his full comment). Having realized that he can no longer maintain an argument for the illogical nature of the Hypostatic Union, he now claims that the analogy I have used throughout this post is mere mental gymnastics. Note, dear reader, once again that there is no proof as to why (and if such an analogy was indeed mental gymnastic why then was he seemingly fine with trying to refute it before I set out to systematically dismantle his claims one by one through this post?).

Furthermore, what such an analogy has to do with are principles of logic—such hold true irrespective of what is being discussed as long as the factors are properly defined. We are not in fact saying that God is a box or a triangle but rather that the same principles of identity and non-contradiction (and I suppose also the principle of excluded middle) that operate in the Triangle-box analogy also hold true for the being of God. Any student of logic would know as much and yet Mr. Ghilan pretends otherwise. Make no mistake about this, dear reader: in deriding my analogy, Mr. Ghilan is attempting to draw one away from the crucial principles of thought which are presented therein for he understands that he has been completely refuted. Alas, when one can’t defend their point, I suppose that ridicule is the next best course to undertake.

Finally, the individual makes the claim that he has deconstructed my argument and shown it to be faulty. There’s not much I can say to that except that those who have bothered to read this post certainly know otherwise.

This then is how I found myself reading the blog post entitled, Talking About God, by one Mohamed Ghilan. The article, as one would expect, discusses the subject of God from an Islamic perspective and in the course of the work, touches on many things—one being Christianity and its alleged incompatibility with logic. Now, longtime readers of this blog will know that I have already shown how this is not the case and refuted the various examples that Muslims (and other non-Christians) will invariably bring up here (I would certainly recommend this article to Muslims seeing as it features a discussion between myself and Muslims on a Muslim forum), here, here, and here. I intend to make reference to the aforementioned posts and more throughout this article. It goes without saying that reading each post on its own would certainly prove beneficial as well.

The blogger, Mohamed Ghilan, seeks to pit Christianity against logical thinking and by such a manner attempt to prove how vastly superior Islam is. The fact of the matter is that it is precisely Islam that is contrary to reason and the general Muslim position that is unschooled in the proper use of thought. Granted these words can be deemed hurtful and for this fact I must apologize. We will go nowhere if our intent is to willfully denigrate the beliefs of others and this is sincerely not my intention. I say the things I say not because I want to anger Muslims, but rather because I honestly think them to be wrong and their beliefs false. At this time, let us examine the claims of Mohamed Ghilan and see who actually misconstrues logic—whether the Christian or the Muslim.

The problem with an anthropomorphic God is in the floodgates of inquiry such a proposition opens. To explain what I mean I’ll need to pre-empt you with a very brief explanation about the Law of Non-Contradiction in logic. It simply means that two contradictory statements cannot both be true at the same time. For example, if I say that something is black and it’s not black, I would not be making very much sense. The two propositions here are mutually exclusive; it’s either black or it’s not. — Mohamed Ghilan

The concept of an anthropomorphic God is indeed troublesome. As a Christian, I join Muslims and Jews in stating emphatically that God, as he is in himself, is not anthropomorphic at all. Furthermore, that it is impossible for the divine nature to change and finally, that God is not a god of contradictions. With that out of the way, we should turn to the author’s words; particularly his definition of the law of non-contradiction. This is one of the three fundamental laws of thought and already we see that this individual has not formulated it completely and as such has paved the way for his first error. The complete rendition of the law is as follows: “two contradictory statements cannot both be true at the same time, in the same sense or way.” The section which Mr. Ghilan failed to include (i.e. the part which I have underlined) is in fact quite crucial for the simple fact that two contradictory facts can be true of an object as long as these are not to be understood in the same sense. Let us take the example that the author provides: that of a piece of paper. Assuming that the sheet of paper is divided wherein half of the sheet is black and half of it is white, it would in fact be entirely correct to say that this thing is “black and it’s not black” at the same time. For it all depends on what ‘black’ and ‘not black’ are referring to. It is here that we begin to see the great error with Islamic thought—a misformulation and misunderstanding of the law of non-contradiction.

Where this matters with the “God” conversation is in the propositions put forth according to Christianity. On the one hand, God is the Alpha and Omega without a beginning or an end. He was not created and He does not die. He’s transcendent beyond His creation. Yet on the other hand man is made in His image. — Ibid.

Once again we are introduced with a string of alleged contradictions as proof for why Christianity is a blight to the human mind and yet the irony of the matter is that the very individuals who accuse Christians of violating a fundamental rule of logic are themselves the ones who should be studying logic at our knee! First off, the author wishes to drive a wedge between God being eternal, infinite, omnipotent and man having been created in his image according to the Holy Bible (Genesis 1:27). Such a thing could only be problematic if we understood the phrase “in his image” as meaning “exactly like God” and this is not the case. It merely means that man possesses qualities which, albeit infinitely removed from God’s majesty, are nevertheless similar to God’s own. If the matter is understood in such a fashion, then there is absolutely no contradiction present. Of course the unbiased individual would quite easily have understood the text in question in this manner for the Bible is emphatic that there is no one like God (Jeremiah 10:6, Isaiah 46:9). If this weren’t enough, it would seem that Mr. Mohamed Ghilan is not well-versed in the teachings of his own religion for Islam actually does teach that mankind was created in the image of God!

“When any one of you fights with his brother, he should avoid his face for Allah created Adam in his [or His own] image.” — Sahih Muslim, Hadith 4731

“Narrated Abu Hurairah: The Prophet said: ‘Allah created Adam in His Image.’”  — Sahih Al-Bukhari, vol. 8, Hadith no. 246

Here is how a Muslim source explains the above hadith. Notice that one of the resolutions to the problem is that which I (and indeed all of orthodox Christianity for over 1, 000 years) have proposed? If then both Islam and Christianity supposedly teach the same thing, and both make use of a similar response to resolve an alleged contradiction, why then are Muslims so quick to overlook this fact and accuse Christians? It is either through ignorance or sheer deception.

Yet still Mr. Ghilan might disagree. He may maintain that the above answer to this supposed problem is faulty for how could anything be like God? In assuming this position, he would have to deny that there is any sort of resemblance—however vague—between man and God. Such a position is intellectual suicide for it would reduce one to being unable to know anything about God at all. Such that when one might say that Allah is merciful, the truth of the matter would be that this phrase would become completely unintelligible. If nothing indeed is similar to God (even in the vaguest sense), then so too will the words we use to express certain concepts lose all meaning when referring to God (seeing as there can exist no similarity whatsoever between our understanding of a concept, and the concept as embodied in God). This would net out to Mr. Ghilan’s holy book, the Qur’an, being a useless book seeing as it couldn’t possibly tell us anything worthwhile about the divine. The Muslim couldn’t possible understand what the phrase, “God is merciful” is supposed to mean seeing as his understanding of mercy could have no relation whatsoever with whatever the sentence,”Allah is Merciful” is supposed to mean. Whatever option that the author, to whom this response is directed at, chooses, the end result will still be one in which he is in error and his reasoning faulty.

Not to mention the mystery of the Trinity that requires one to believe that God is 3 in 1 and 1 in 3. He’s the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. But the Father is not the Son and the Holy Spirit is neither. [...] Basically, if I were a Christian I would have to hold some contradicting beliefs at the same time. — Mohamed Ghilan

In the above, the author wants to imply that a contradiction immediately implies a falsehood and as in the matter of our paper example, this is not the case. Seeing as the author had wished to argue his point by way of logic, we cannot let his misuse of logic go uncontested. It is in fact quite easy to disprove the Islamic argument (for it never functioned on logic in the first place) and so here is a portion of my, Of Gods and Men, post (as always, I would encourage a full reading of the text to see how badly Muslims misconstrue logic) which deals with the Hypostatic Union:

In laymen’s terms, this is the doctrine which stipulates that the eternal second person of the Trinity, in entering his creation and being born a man, took on a second nature he did not previously possess—that of a human. It must be noted that the divine nature did not become finite. Absolutely not, God as he is in himself did not become finite, rather he added onto himself the nature of humanity (and everything that comes with this nature) without divesting himself of divinity (that itself being impossible) so that within the one Christ there exist simultaneously two natures without the dilution of one into the other. [...] The question then becomes, whether it is logical for a person to be both God and man at the same time seeing as to be God means to be infinite and to be man is to be finite. While in truth, this question has already been answered by the verbiage above, I suppose that it wouldn’t hurt to go over it again in far simpler terms.

Keeping in line with my wish for simplicity, let us imagine a triangle. Now we all know the nature of a triangle i.e. it’s attributes, the things that make a triangle a triangle as opposed to a rectangle or circle. Good. Now let us at this point imagine a box. Once more we know what is the nature of a box and furthermore, we are also aware that the nature of a box is in direct contradiction to the nature of a triangle. Now suppose that we were to place the triangle within the box, would we then have a confusion, a mixing, an intermingling of the two essences/natures? No, we would possess one unit (the Triangle-Box if you would like) with the essences of both objects intact. The triangle would not cease to be a triangle and neither would the box cease to be a box—on the contrary we would now have a unit that possesses in its being the very attributes of both in that it is not half a box and half a triangle but rather a full (perfect) triangle and a full (perfect) box. A veritable Triangle-Box, wherein the unit is one but the essences are two. In just the same manner does the Christian speak of God becoming man. God did not cease being God, he did not convert the divine essence into a human essence; instead he took on a second nature aside from his divine nature. As such in the unit that is the individual, Christ Jesus, there are two natures with contradicting attributes simultaneously present. As with the Triangle-Box, Jesus can claim the otherwise mutually exclusive prerogatives that come with each nature because of them being simultaneously existent in his being. Such that he can increase in knowledge as man, but always have known all things as God. Such that he can pray to the Father as man, yet have no need to do so as God. Such that should he will it, he is able to give his life unto death as man, and yet death never having any power or hold over him as God. He does everything as the God-Man—mystery upon mystery. In short, He is both three-sided and four-sided at the same time.

The gripe that Muslims have with the doctrine of the hypostatic union is that it supposedly teaches that God (that is, as he is in himself/inherently) underwent change and yet this is impossible, for God is supposed to be unchanging. What the Muslim however fails to understand is that Christians do not teach such blasphemy. Just as in the example above, in adding the triangle into the box, we did not change the nature of the triangle nor the box. Whatever was true of each essence before the joining together into one unit, is still true after the event (i.e. placing the triangle inside the box). As such the unit that is the Traingle-Box, would retain all the attributes of both natures without such violating the law of non-contradiction. This really is basic logic.

As the above readily displays, the divinity of Christ is not an illogical doctrine. Muslims are simply unaware of the teachings of Christianity and the little that they do know is horrible caricature. I understand that I am speaking rather boldly, yet I do so in the hope that these words will lead even one Muslim to think of the matter seriously. I have never met a single Muslim who did not believe the Christian conception of God to be a violation of the law of non-contradiction and yet the truth is that this is not the case at all. So in reality, the overwhelming majority of Muslims—if not all Muslims altogether—simply are incapable of possessing a mastery of logic. So hopefully, the Muslim can begin to understand the Christian’s frustration when it is claimed that what we pander is base sophistry.

Dear Muslim, and I certainly do not mean this to be offensive, but please ask yourself why it is the case that you have been unable to see how erroneous your understanding of reason has been? How is it that such an entire demographic can commit such an error wholesale? If then I cannot trust Islam concerning truth that I can know through simple reason, how then could I ever trust the religion of Muhammad when it comes to truth that I could not possibly know short of a revelation from God (e.g. how to establish a relationship with him)? Once again, if I cannot trust Islam with my intellect, why then should I trust it with my eternal soul? Islam truly does darken the mind and if one need see specific proof of this claim, one simply ought to read the various discussions I have had with Muslims—particularly on the issue of whether the Bible teaches the divinity of Christ. Please don’t take my word for it, simply read through the conversation and judge for yourself, dear reader.

I have not made a logical defense of the Holy Trinity within this article for the simple reason that I have done so elsewhere (please follow the links) and at the moment can’t really be bothered to repeat myself once again. If one thought that the above article was an excellent exposition concerning the matter of the Muslim and logic, one really needs to see what happens when Muslims are actually taken to task on the subject of the Trinity and the oneness of God. It is my hope that Muslims, and Mr. Ghilan in particular, will have the intellectual fortitude to at least listen to the Christian understanding of these doctrines.

(I know that I ended up misnumbering but it would be a pain to change the numbers now. Also, clicking the picture will increase its size and make for an easier read.)

1, 2a, 2b, 2c, 3a, 3b, 3c, 4, 5a, 5b, 6a, 6b, 7a, 7b, 7c, 7d, 8, 9, 10, 11a, 11b, 11c, 11d, 11e, 11f, 11g, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18a, 18b, 18c, 18d, 18e, 18f, 18g, 19a, 19b, 19c, 19d, 19e, 20, 23, 24a, 24b, 24c, 25, 26, 27,

Recently however, I have browsed through this individual’s blog again and found that the author is again reiterating the same viewpoint I had claimed to be faulty. Now, before being misunderstood, I should say that I am emphatic of the fact that every individual has the right to express their own opinion. Yet what I do take issue with, is the fact that in writing a post solely to defend his viewpoint and presenting once again the very same arguments—which to the best of my knowledge I have already refuted here (scroll down towards the comment section), here (once again make your way to the comments), here (within the comments) and in my “On (Christian) Unitarianism and 1 Corinthians 8:6” post (the first link within this post)—he is ignoring what I claim to be insurmountable problems with his understanding of the Bible. Moreover, in providing no reply to my argument and yet continuing to present the same points to his audience (as if no challenge to his understanding of theology has been presented) he risks being accused of intellectual dishonesty (not that I am accusing him of such) and failing to take to heart the very dictum he quotes in his post:

“I recently read that an honest but mistaken man; when show the truth, ceases to be mistaken; or he ceases to be honest.” — landsway

All this to say, given that landsway has taken it upon himself to defend his position as biblical truth, then at the very least he owes that post of mine that specifically deals with 1 Cor. 8:6 a response. It is likely that he has forgotten all about our past exchange yet due to his unprompted decision to make a post solely to promote his reading of scripture, he must in all honesty defend his methodology and conclusion from criticism.

As I surveyed the article to which this response will concern itself with, I took particular note of the fact that the author chose not to defend the 5 syllogisms to which his earlier article consisted of. Instead, the author took a slightly different approach by abandoning his initial proofs (i.e. the syllogisms) altogether. Now given that I had claimed that his syllogisms were refuted and that we have found ourselves with no defence of them, I will thus stand by my initial conclusion.

I appreciate we have arrived at sort of commonality, that is your submittal to the fact there exists ‘one set of evidence’ in the Gospels showing Christ Jesus to be exclusively human in nature, but then you present another set which you purport is the New Testament’s main theme; the ascertainment of Christ’s Divinity, and as such it would seem to suggest there exists internal in-consistency within the New Testament and the Bible as a whole. — 6sman

In all things, it is good to have the habit of placing the matter into perspective. While the above may have some form of truth, I do not believe it to be so—both for what was actually agreed upon within our discussion, and from the conclusion we can gain as it concerns the Holy Bible and the New Testament as a whole. In the above, the author implies that the ‘two sets of evidence’ are in contradiction as to what they wish to prove regarding the person of Jesus Christ. This is incorrect. When it comes to Christ, the New Testament seeks to teach that Christ is the God-man. To this end, we find evidence for Christ’s humanity and evidence for Christ’s divinity. There is as little inconsistency to this as there is concerning the fact that scripture teaches that the individual is both mortal and immortal. The body succumbs to physical death and yet the soul is untouched—the individual continues to exist forever. Finding fault in the dual nature of Christ is like finding fault in the duel nature of man. To then say that the evidence is contradictory makes little sense when the message is supposed to be one where dual natures must play some part. If the Bible teaches that man is both mortal and immortal, how then can one try to find fault with it by claiming that it contains passages which teach man’s mortality and others which teach man’s immortality? If such a thing is utter nonsense in the case of the mortality and immortality of man, on what basis can we then suppose that the same argument (with all its faults) will suddenly become logically sound simply because we are now discussing the person of Jesus Christ in particular?

The fact of the matter is, one can only come to see the dual-nature of Christ as a contradiction if they start from the position that the Bible teaches Christ to only be a man (in the same way that one could only come to the conclusion that the bible claims that the soul–once created–does not exist forever if they already believe that man is only mortal). What must the unbiased individual do when the very people who call Christ a man also go on to call him God? What must the unbiased individual do when the very person who describes himself as man also describes himself as eternally God? The only logical conclusion is to suppose that both are in fact being affirmed without contradiction. As such, it isn’t that there is one set of evidence which describes Christ as being ‘exclusively’ a man and another which describe him as being exclusively divine, rather, there is only one set of evidence which describes the Christ as the God-man and this one set comprises all the passages where Christ’s humanity and divinity are affirmed by both himself and those around him. In the above the author implied that I agreed with him that the Bible taught two different things and that is false, here are my words again:

The Christian claim has always been that Christ is both God and man. This is why one is able to find passages to the effect that Christ quite clearly is a man and yet at the same time find passages which declare that Christ is in fact the One true God Himself. Notice that the opponent of the Christian cannot make sense of these passages where Christ is quite clearly presented as God [...] It is only the Christian position which can make sense of everything the Bible says concerning Christ and this has been—and continues to be—seen throughout this response to 6sman’s article.

As Christians, we take the above not merely on faith but rather, reason compels us to.

The reader would’ve noticed larger amount of quotations presented in favor of Christ’s[p] Divinity are not really his. These are extra-Injilic statements like those of St.Paul (who by no means was a full-blooded Trinitarian [See: 1 Corinthians, 8:6]), or some anonymous NT writers, even John’s prologue wasn’t his own but was part of the Gospels later redaction — 6sman

What the reader should note concerning the above (aside for the incorrect claim that Paul wasn’t thoroughly trinitarian)  is that the argument has suddenly changed from “the Bible shows that Christ is not divine” to “if we ignore what the Bible says concerning the divine inspiration of its writers (in this case, St. Paul) and thus ignore vast sections of the Bible, we can then claim that the Bible does not show Christ to be Divine”. Well the fact of the matter is, if we ignore vast sections of anything then we could certainly prove almost anything therefrom. In fact, if we ignore vast sections of the Qur’an, we could prove that it claims that Muslims are allowed to drink alcohol, that according to the Qur’an, Christ is the greatest individual who has ever lived, that the Gospel isn’t corrupt (as Muslims claim), and that it is the revelation intended for Mankind (and not just exclusively to the nation of Israel as most Muslims claim), among other things. Yet are these actually what this book teaches? Furthermore, the claim that the Bible only teaches the humanity of Christ does not come from an adherence to the words of Christ from the Bible (as we shall soon see) but rather from a veiled attempt at advancing the Qur’an’s perspective as the Bible’s. The reader should make no mistake about it: The basic premise underlying 6sman’s argument is “the Qur’an claims Christ to only be a man, hence the Bible claims Christ to only be a man, therefore any biblical attestation to Christ’s divinity is false and must be discounted”. Such is faulty argumentation and before we delve into a refutation thereof, here are a few other statements where the author once more asserts that Christ is not God:

[...] all these statements can easily and evidently be interpreted otherwise towards comparatively more harmonized theme with the Old Testament which incidently carries not shred of evidence for the Trinity concept, one simply has to presume it’s veracity in order to locate ‘suitable’ citations.

Aside from the erroneous assertion that the Old Testament contains no shred of the Holy Trinity (if so, then I’d welcome an answer to the question I posed here), it is also claimed that the words of Christ can be ‘easily and evidently’ watered down to exhortations of possessing no such thing as divinity. Let us then see if such a statement is at all correct. In fact, let us at this time ignore what I think, let us ignore what 6sman thinks, and let us turn to individuals whose qualifications on the Old Testament and whose authority on matters thereof could be challenged by no one, save God himself. I speak of course of the Jewish temple aristocracy during the time of Christ. If the claims made by Christ could so easily be made to fit into the Jewish (and I suppose, in some sense, with the Islamic understanding) of sonship, then we should see this evidenced in their dealings with Jesus Christ:

And the high priest arose and said to Him, “Do You answer nothing? What is it these men testify against You?” ⁶³But Jesus kept silent. And the high priest answered and said to Him, “I put You under oath by the living God: Tell us if You are the Christ, the Son of God!” ⁶⁴Jesus said to him, “It is as you said. Nevertheless, I say to you, hereafter you will see the Son of Man sitting at the right hand of the Power, and coming on the clouds of heaven.” ⁶⁵Then the high priest tore his clothes, saying, “He has spoken blasphemy! What further need do we have of witnesses? Look, now you have heard His blasphemy! ⁶⁶What do you think?” They answered and said, “He is deserving of death.” — Matthew 26:62-66 NKJV

In reading the above we see that the reaction to Jesus’ claims was disastrous and emotionally charged. The high priest tore his very clothes—the quintessential expression of grief and/or righteous indignation in biblical times (such as when the holiest artifact in Judaism, the Ark of the Covenant, was captured by the Phillistines in 1 Samuel 4:11-12; or again as an expression of the highest grief in 2 Chronicles 34:26-27)—and this should alert us to the grave nature of it all. The question we must then ask ourselves is, what exactly was blasphemous about Christ’s statement?

The importance of this saying is that it forms the climax of the interrogation before the high priest. In Mark’s presentation it is the claim which constitutes the point of his final rejection by the Jewish authorities, and leads immediately to the decision to have him killed. The claim is judged by the high priest and his council to be blasphemy. It is not immediately clear why this should be blasphemy. Certainly the claim to be Messiah is not blasphemous, for other messianic claimants soon before or after this were not condemned for blasphemy. Most probably the reason is the combination of ‘seated at the right hand of the Power’ and ‘coming with the clouds of heaven’. This implies that Jesus is to be at the right hand of God on his throne. But if while ‘seated’ he is also ‘coming’, he must be actually sharing the mobile Merkabah-throne of God. This Merkabah-throne is the chariot-throne on which God is seated in Ezekiel 1. Already at the time of Jesus this imagery bulked large in the imagination and descriptions of Jewish mysticism (called Merkabah-mysticism). Such a claim would give good grounds for the charge of blasphemy. [...] In the prophecy preceding this vision Daniel describes four great beasts, representing the four great empires which persecuted and oppressed the Jewish nation. The son of man, in his turn, represents the nation itself, at last vindicated and triumphant, and finally to rule over the whole world with God’s own authority. Mark understands the expression, well-known to have been characteristic of Jesus, to be this son of man, sharing God’s power and authority. However in this final saying he goes beyond the prophecy, to represent Jesus as sharing the throne itself of God. The trial scene is, then, for Mark the climax of his presentation of the mystery and meaning of Jesus. — Dom Henry Wansbrough

This monumental declaration should not be lost on us. The Saviour has just been asked whether he is the promised Messiah and he answers this in the affirmative and yet within the same breath he declares something astounding—he claims to sit on God’s very throne! This is something unprecedented. It goes without saying that the Messiah was to sit on his father David’s throne (Isaiah 16:5), but for Christ to supersede even this and claim to be seated on the throne of God himself is nothing short of blasphemy should such an assertion be untrue. To be seated on the throne of God is to rule as God and to in fact be God just as to be seated on the throne of the king is to rule as king and to be the king, there is absolutely no question about this. This then is why the Sanhedrin was so mortified and why the council agreed to the sentencing of death. We see this again in John 19:7 where the Jewish leaders claim that the law demands that Jesus ought to be killed for making himself out to be the Son of God. Quite clearly, there would be no issue with this if the Christ described his sonship in terms which were within the limits of acceptable Jewish thought (for throughout the Old Testament, various individuals are termed son(s) of God) and yet he didn’t. His sonship was markedly different and this can be seen by the Christ’s repeated claims to divinity. This then is why the unbelieving council could charge him under Deut. 13:6-10 seeing as they incorrectly understood Christ as setting himself up as another god instead of being the One true God of Israel (though one doubts that they’d believe this either). It is telling that no other Messiah-claimant (such as Simon bar Giora of Geresa, Simon Bar Kochba, Sabbatai Sevi, Rabbi Menachem Mendel Schneerson) was charged with blasphemy for claiming to be the Messiah because as has been seen, to claim to be the Messiah is not a blasphemous claim at all to make. To claim to be God on the other hand, certainly would be seen as blasphemy deserving death.

I see your main defense against those arguments is the hypostatic unity hypothesis, wherein Jesus[p] is described of possessing both human and Divine (God-man) natures but choosing, for some odd reason, to veil his true identity. To which I ask, why? If God literally visits us (incarnates) in person why then should He hide Himself and make not things clearer when the need to do so is evermore increased? — 6sman

The simple answer is that he did make this clear, repeatedly in fact—to the point where he presented himself before the highest Jewish authority of that time and declared himself to be God and this instead illicited shouts of anger and derision by those very individuals who claimed to worship him, YHWH. The above objection is baseless and betrays a thorough misunderstanding of the text seeing as the principal parties were all clear as to what Christ was preaching. He claimed to be the promised Messiah and yet to be YHWH in the flesh.

Moreover, when Jesus[p] was telling us he couldn’t do this and didn’t know that should we not accept his words in their simple connotation as opposed to hiding behind the veil of hypostasis? And if this theory be granted then what tool are we left with in order to determine which statement of Jesus[p] is true in meaning and which is superficial? If statements wherein humanity is emphasized can be taken as allegories, why not adopt a far more safer and rational due course in interpreting those “Divinity claims” as likewise metaphoric? When Jesus[p] says “I  and the Father are one” Christians are quick to point toward his Divinity ignoring altogether he was in his human nature, but when he says “my Father is greater than I”, his human part was speaking. If statements wherein Jesus[p] is seen denying his Divinity are waved off as un-real due to human form, those proclaimed ‘Divinity statements’ become even more susceptible to denial. The problem with the veil hypothesis is that Jesus[p], or any else one fancies, remains God however much he may want to deny it! — Ibid.

Once again 6sman misunderstands the Christian claim as being an allegorizing of his humanity. This is wholly incorrect, in fact this is the heresy called Docetism which the early church, in its bid to remain faithful to the truth of the Gospel, vehemently combated. Christ is both God and man. I should also say that I am thoroughly displeased with 6sman’s claims that I insinuated that we should treat those words of Christ dealing with the limits of his humanity, as metaphoric—I never said any such thing. However, I recall saying: “The Second Person of the Trinity truly did become man and as man he veiled his full glory to the point where he withheld from himself the free exercise of his divine prerogatives and relied solely on the Father. [...] The Son is both God and man and as man he certainly was limited but as God he was without any constraints. ‘The Son’ refers to the God-man and as such Christ can truly speak of ‘the Son’ not knowing the day nor the hour because while he veiled his glory in his humanity, it certainly was the case that he did not allow himself access to this knowledge. …” Notice my repeated insistence on the reality of Christ’s humanity (and the limits thereof)? Where then do we get the sense that the Christian claims Jesus’ humanity to have only been a chimera? Also, 6sman tries to present the issue as one in which we must treat one set of claims as wholly metaphoric and yet this isn’t the case. While he tries to take issue with my position for supposedly choosing claims of divinity over those of humanity, this once again is untrue and ironically enough, he is the one who is effectively picking and choosing which set of claims to believe. The Christian, on the other hand, believes both to be equally true. We have yet to be presented with evidence for why this is illogical and as such I, for one, must wonder why this line of thought is employed (while wholly unproved) in my interlocutor’s argument.

It is in-conceivable, even un-intelligible to think created and un-created, finite and infinite, omniscient but un-aware mind exists, and if Jesus[p] had two different minds then they couldn’t be one same person. — Ibid.

The above plays on words and concepts yet does little in actually proving one’s point. I have already spoken at length concerning the matter in my Of Gods and Men article and have yet to come across any Muslim rejoinder. Until we can find ourselves with a logical reason for as to why the Christian understanding fails, I will just ignore the above and once again (for perhaps the second or third time) point my interlocutor to the aforementioned article. Also, the mind is quite the wonderful thing and we would not even need to posit two separate minds in order to make sense of the Gospel account. The full scope of the divine conscious could merely reside within the subconscious of the human Christ so that we would not need to multiply consciousness (incidentally 6sman’s argument borders on Apollinarism, another heresy) and yet still find ourselves with a distinction between human and divine knowledge. Clearly, all objections fall by the wayside.

One Christ. One Death. One Resurrection. And One Glory. If, however, you wish to say that given that Christ is truly alive (and forever more!) then his death wasn’t a true sacrifice, I would have to say that this assertion has more to do with your misunderstanding of the matter of sacrifice as God laid out in the Old Testament. According to the criteria found therein, the sacrifice of Christ qualifies and this certainly is all that matters. For more on this, see here.

Some of our oldest English translations of John chapter 1, prior to King James indicate thisimpersonality when they speak of the word as ‘it’ instead of the modern ‘he’ [Tyndale Bible (1530), Geneva Bible (1560)]. So just as God’s speech in Genesis 1 became physical creation, so also did God’s Word became flesh (Jesus) and dwelt among us. [...] To read John 1:1 as if it said; ‘in the beginning was the Son and the Son was with God…’ is not only a pre-supposition but also very problematic;for in that case we would have to read the verse as follows: ‘… and the Son was with the Father, the Son was the Father…’ and no Christian subscribes to that. The Son, therefore, is not Logos: the Word became the Son, here’s a very acute distinction often misapprehended. — Ibid.

I certainly don’t see 6sman’s point when I can point to an even earlier English translation (Wycliffe’s Bible) which uses the equivalent for ‘him’ instead of ‘it’:

JN 1:1 In the bigynnyng was the word, and the word was at God, and God was the word.
JN 1:2 This was in the bigynnyng at God.
JN 1:3 Alle thingis weren maad bi hym, and withouten hym was maad no thing, that thing that was maad.
JN 1:4 In hym was lijf, and the lijf was the liyt of men; and the liyt schyneth in derknessis,
JN 1:5 and derknessis comprehendiden not it.

that said, what use is pointing to an English translation from an age where scholarship on the matter wasn’t particularly the best? Why is it that 6sman cannot point to a Greek manuscript to confirm his claims? Better yet, could he give us a literal translation of the Greek? Furthermore, ‘it’ does not immediately give itself to claims of impersonality seeing as even in our English language, we ask questions such as “is it a boy or girl?” etc. We should also mention that the claim that ‘it’ must mean something impersonal is a rather recent development, in fact Samuel Taylor Coleridge was an early advocate of this and this was only in the 18th century—long after Tyndale’s Bible and the Geneva Bible were published! So clearly, in this respect, 6sman’s argument is wholly unfounded, relies on bad scholarship and is in actuality deceiving. If that weren’t all, the very text in question tells us that the word is the Son!

¹⁴ The Word became flesh and made his dwelling among us. We have seen his glory, the glory of the one and only Son, who came from the Father, full of grace and truth. — John 1:14 NIV

Earlier in the prologue, the disciple John claimed that the Word created everything (flesh included) and here we see something even more astounding, the word itself assumed flesh. Notice the distinction here: first the word created and made all things, then the word itself becomes part of what it has created and dwells among men. The glory of the Word was evidently seen by all, that being the glory of the only Son of the Father. How can anyone read the above and then make the claim that the prologue does not identify the Logos to be the Son? If one can read the above and disagree with the Christian position than this tells us a lot less about clarity than about the character possessed by such an individual.

The author goes on to claim that identifying the word as the Son would lead to the word being the Father and this is false. The being of God is not uni-personal, rather, the One God consists of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. As such, the word God can refer to one of these persons, two of these persons or all of these persons—context determines subject. The above is only a problem if one believes God to be uni-personal and given that the Christian does not, then all objections give way.

Eventually, the author of the article to which this rejoinder is directed at, makes use of Acts 4:24-30 and particularly the phrase “against your holy servant Jesus” to claim that Christ is not God himself. At this point I must confess that it’s become quite aggravating to consistently be presented with arguments such as the above where the author picks and chooses parts of quotes which they can best use to prove their point while ignoring the actual message. Herein, the author makes his case from the words of Peter and John so then let us suppose that these are a viable authority (for we would not be presented with the quotation if 6sman did not wish for us to conform to what they claimed). Let us see what exactly Peter and John thought of this Jesus, the Christ, the righteous servant of God. Insomuch as 6sman has made his case on the words of these inidviduals, one must wonder if he also agrees with John when he calls Christ life itself and claims that he preexisted with the Father (1 John 1:1-4), when he states that the blood of Christ purifies us from all sin (1 John 1:7), or when John declares that there is no salvation apart from believing that Jesus Christ is the Son of God:

We accept human testimony, but God’s testimony is greater because it is the testimony of God, which he has given about his Son. ¹⁰ Whoever believes in the Son of God accepts this testimony. Whoever does not believe God has made him out to be a liar, because they have not believed the testimony God has given about his Son. ¹¹ And this is the testimony: God has given us eternal life, and this life is in his Son. ¹² Whoever has the Son has life; whoever does not have the Son of God does not have life. — 1 John 5:9-12 NIV

If John is to be believed than all other religions including Islam are false. If John is to be believed then God himself has given his testimony concerning his only-begotten Son and there is salvation in no one else (Acts: 4:10-12).

The same is true of Peter. Should we believe Peter when he says that Christ is “the author of life” and that he was killed and raised to life (Acts 3:15), or that Deut. 18:15-18 applies to Christ and not Muhammad (Acts 3:21-23)? Should we believe him when he says that Jesus Christ is “our God and Saviour” (2 Peter 1:1), or when he says that the writings of Paul are inspired by God:

Bear in mind that our Lord’s patience means salvation, just as our dear brother Paul also wrote you with the wisdom that God gave him. ¹⁶ He writes the same way in all his letters, speaking in them of these matters. His letters contain some things that are hard to understand, which ignorant and unstable people distort, as they do the other Scriptures, to their own destruction. ¹⁷ Therefore, dear friends, since you have been forewarned, be on your guard so that you may not be carried away by the error of the lawless and fall from your secure position. ¹⁸ But grow in the grace and knowledge of our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ. To him be glory both now and forever! Amen. — 2 Peter 3:15-18 NIV

If we are to believe the words of Peter when he calls Christ the servant of God, we must also believe his words when he calls Christ our God and Saviour, and we must certainly believe him when he places his seal of approval on the writings of Paul. Imagine with me, if you will, that we were at a trial and 6sman (after having claimed that we should not believe the words of Paul) calls the venerable Peter to the stand. St. Peter takes his place at the stand and after swearing to tell nothing but the truth (so help him God!) 6sman questions him as to the words of Acts 4:24-30 and particularly the instance of him calling Christ the servant of God. Peter does indeed say to the court that Christ is the servant of God to which then 6sman states that he has no more questions. Imagine now dear reader, that it was time to cross-examinate this individual. Imagine that Peter was asked to confirm the claim of having called Jesus of Nazareth, “our God and Saviour”. Imagine that Peter was asked to confirm whether he believed the words of Paul to have been inspired by God and finally imagine—as the evidence has clearly shown—that St. Peter answers these series of questions in the affirmative as well. Now dear reader, I ask you, which case has been shown to conform to the truth, the Muslim position or the Christian position? Let us remember that the very witness on whose testimony 6sman based his case has completely refuted him and has instead confirmed the Christian truth. Truly, which position is actually in keeping with the Bible?

More than this, it should be asked whether 6sman will now believe his own witness—the very witness whom he had wanted us to believe when he had thought that he had a case against Christian teaching? This isn’t an isolated instance either, we could make the same case and ask him the same question when  it comes to the testimony of John (and I have already asked him this when it came to the subject of James 1:13-14) or of Jesus himself when he claims to sit on the very throne of God! The fact of the matter is that, as I had mentioned earlier, the Muslim position is not one in which they allow for the Bible to speak for itself. Rather, they seek to subvert it by carefully trying to present the Qur’an’s perspective as that of the Bible and this is clearly evident by the situation we find ourselves in right now. If 6sman believes that his argument at all conforms to the truth of the bible instead of the message propagated by the Muslim holy book, he will agree with what has just been presented herein—if he doesn’t, then his position was never based on the Holy Bible in the first place.

Let us not mince words, the Muslim position is thoroughly against what God has revealed in the Bible and it is only Christianity which conforms to the truth thereof.

Now, I have said this before but prior to moving on with the rest of this post, it would do us well if I were to repeat it here: arguments such as the one presented by 6sman simply cannot work, they are self-serving and will invariably crumble under scrutiny. They rely on merely interacting with only one set of data while ignoring everything else which contradict one’s point. They cannot account for the body of evidence that we are presented with within the Holy Bible but merely with a few of these and, not surprisingly, only those which fit the point that we would like to make. To the reader, you will be met with two forms of argumentation: one which only takes account of a small subset of the evidence available to us, and another which takes everything into account. At the end of this presentation, you really ought to ask yourself who made the better argument and whose presentation can actually harmonize everything that the Bible says concerning Jesus Christ.

“And you will know the truth, and the truth will set you free.” — John 8:32 ESV

The author of the article in question, presents us with 5 syllogisms by which he aims to disprove the divinity of Christ which he believes is not attested in the Bible at all. Here, they will be enumerated one by one and as part of my reply, I will repeatedly show how his argument suffers from the problems I have already listed in the above paragraph.

God is the Maximal Being. Jesus was Inferior. Jesus, therefore, was not God! [...] Now Jesus speaks no parables when he said, as in John’s Gospel: Truly, truly, I say to you, a servant is not greater than his master; nor is he who is sent (Jesus) greater than He (the Father) who sent him. [John 13:16] Here we see Jesus[p] placing himself below God, in other clearer terms: …the Father is greater than I. [John 14:28] So if we were to follow the above principle that any-one having some greater than himself isn’t God, and truly believe God is the greatest conceivable being, and acknowledge that Jesus [p] by his own admission is not the greatest being, then it follows reasonably that Jesus is not God. — 6sman (emphasis mine)

The Christian should never deny that Christ is subordinate to the Father (the Father is the First Person of the Trinity and the Son is the second; the Father is unbegotten and the Son is indeed begotten, the Father sends and the Son is sent etc.) but one must wonder what type of inferiority is spoken of here? Positional inferiority or ontological inferiority? Let us mark the difference between the two first:

( a ) Positional inferiority (otherwise known as Functional Submission): is inferiority (I hate to use this word given its less than pleasant connotations however I find myself using it due to the precedent set by 6sman) of relation such as what many Christians and Muslims find exemplified in the relationship between the husband and his wife. The wife is submissive to the husband—not because she isn’t his equal in nature, but rather as a willful choice on her part. This is the example of Sarah, and she is praised for it and called the mother of believers (1 Peter 3:1-7) because of her character and faith. Sarah was equal to Abraham in being—whatever was true of the human nature which was possessed of Abraham was equally true of Sarah. In no way can she be said to be objectively inferior to her husband and yet she chose to submit herself to him. Most Muslims will agree with this being the proper dynamic between the husband and his wife (and it certainly is the one which is espoused within the Qur’an and Hadith collections) and yet I know of none who would claim that positional inferiority renders the woman truly inferior to her husband. Positional inferiority does not render one unable to exercise the very same prerogatives enjoyed by their partner. Abraham may have been able to ask Sarah to prepare a meal (Genesis 18:6) but she likewise could also make demands of him, as she did concerning Hagar and her child (Genesis 21:8-13). More could be said concerning the matter (let us not even speak of Rebecca and Isaac!) but suffice to say that should she will it, the woman is perfectly capable of exercising the very properties which arise from the same human nature that she and her husband mutually possess. She lacks nothing and is indeed his equal and although positionally inferior, this does not detract from her capacity to do any of those things which arise from the same nature that she and her husband possess (should she of course decide to employ these). This point is quite important and it is imperative that the reader not forget this because it will serve to tie up this argument.

( b ) Ontological Inferiority: is inferiority of character, nature, being. This does not have to do with choosing to be submissive in one’s role but rather being objectively submissive in one’s nature. To illustrate, while the woman can choose to be inferior towards her husband in role, the dog cannot choose to be inferior to his master in being because it is simply a fact that the human being is of a qualitatively higher order than the other various animals in existence. Ontological inferiority speaks of an objective inferiority, unlike the concept of positional inferiority. That is, the animal does not possess the same attributes as the human and as such they are unable to exercise the same prerogatives as her (while Sarah could in fact exercise the same prerogatives as Abraham because they both possessed the same nature and as such hers was only a subjective inferiority which she placed upon herself).

Now why did we have to go through the above? Because we must realize that statements which imply an inferiority of some sort must be properly examined in order for one to come to know exactly of which sort of inferiority is being spoken of. The author of the article to which this response is directed at implies that Christ’s inferiority is of an ontological persuasion yet is this at all correct? To find our answer we must keep in mind what it means to be positionally and/or ontologically inferior. With this in mind, let us see in what manner the Bible presents the Christ:

Jesus is equated to God (1 Corinthians 2:8), called the creator of all things (John 1:3), is worshiped (Luke 24:51-52), is threatened to be stoned for making himself equal to God (John10:33), demands to be honoured in the exact manner in which the Father is honoured (John 5:23), claims to have existed before his human birth (John 3:13), claims to have existed before Abraham (John 8:58-59), claims to have existed before the creation of the world (John 17:5), is described as indwelling God himself (John 1:18), claims that to have seen him is to have seen the Father (John 10:30), claims to share the exact same glory as the Father (John 17:5), claims to be able to do whatever the Father does (John 5:19), claims to have all authority in heaven and on earth (Matthew 28:18).

If Christ were indeed inferior in being to the Father (and thus not God in nature) then how could the above statements at all be said? Can a mere prophet be said to have existed before God created the world? Can a mere prophet demand to be honoured in the exact same way that God is honoured? Can one imagine worshiping a mere prophet, can one imagine showering this individual with the very praise due only to God (seeing as this is the manner in which God is honoured and Christ demanded the same thing)? How then could Christ demand such a thing if he were not God himself? Let the reader note that none of the above points are dealt with in the article by 6sman. Instead he gives his audience a very skewed perception of the truth claims contained in the bible concerning the Lord Jesus Christ. If Christ is only positionally inferior to the Father then he is in nature identical to the Father and as such is God himself. If Christ is only inferior in role and not in being, then he can certainly speak of the Father being greater than him (because this refers merely to relation) and yet at the same time he can also readily appropriate for himself the very prerogatives of God because he himself is this very God in nature. This could not be the case were the Christ indeed objectively inferior to the Father as 6sman claims (for then the nature of the Father and Christ would be of a qualitatively different order and as the dog no more can claim to the fundamental prerogatives of his master, so neither could Christ appropriate for himself and moreover exhibit the functions, titles, and powers of God). If 6sman’s position was truly correct, then we should not find statements such as in the above paragraph where the Christ quite clearly appropriates for himself the very prerogatives of God. The reader must ask themselves, whose argument is more correct? Is it the argument sustained by the individual 6sman, the very argument which cannot be sustained when all of the evidence is presented? Or is it my argument, the argument which can indeed harmonize all the factors?

“For all the facts harmonize with a true account, whereas the truth soon clashes with a false one.” — Aristotle

Harmony. This is the crucial thing that Muslim arguments on this matter all fail to achieve. They simply cannot account for all the evidence and in fact only work insofar as one keeps their readership ignorant of the full body of evidence. I have noticed this time and time again and it is more than obvious that the article to which I am responding to exemplifies this issue yet again. The author of the article does not deal with the entire body of truth presented to us within the bible and to tell a half-truth is the same as telling no truth.

God is Omniscient. Jesus was in-cognizant. God, it follows, isn’t Jesus! [...] Jesus denies knowledge of parousia for himself, then affirms it as an exclusive property of God. Jesus’ negation of self-omniscience implies un-equality with God in His Divine attributes. Confronted with this problem, Christians take refuge in stating that Jesus ‘as human’ did not know, but had full knowledge ‘as God’. To dispel this counteraction I say Jesus speaks here as not mere servant, but as the Son i.e. what Christians would regard as his true personality. — 6sman (emphasis mine)

It would seem that the author is not satisfied with the Christian response but is this at all warranted? His counter-point concerning the fact that the passage speaks expressively of Christ’s status as the Son in no way damages the Christian response. The Second Person of the Trinity truly did become man and as man he veiled his full glory to the point where he withheld from himself the free exercise of his divine prerogatives and relied solely on the Father. This is not to say that he ever lost any of the divine attributes—no, he simply did not exercise these to the extent that would be proper of him and instead chose to live the life of a common man (Philippians 2:5-11; Hebrews 2:14-18). The Son is both God and man and as man he certainly was limited but as God he was without any constraints. ‘The Son’ refers to the God-man and as such Christ can truly speak of ‘the Son’ not knowing the day nor the hour because while he veiled his glory in his humanity, it certainly was the case that he did not allow himself access to this knowledge. Yet does this mean that the Christ in his divinity did not possess all knowledge? Certainly not because the bible is quite clear that even in his earthly life the Christ knew all things (John 16:30; 21:17). If Christ truly did not possess omniscience (instead of merely limiting himself from accessing the knowledge he has always had) then how at all could he be said to know all things? Moreover, what are we to make of the following where Christ quite clearly claims to know the time of the parousia?

¹² “Look, I am coming soon! My reward is with me, and I will give to each person according to what they have done. ¹³ I am the Alpha and the Omega, the First and the Last, the Beginning and the End. [...] ¹⁶ “I, Jesus, have sent my angel to give you this testimony for the churches. I am the Root and the Offspring of David, and the bright Morning Star.” — Revelation 22:12-13 & 16 NIV

In light of the above, can the author’s argument at all be maintained? If the Christ did not possess omniscience, then what are we to make of the instances where it is said that he does indeed possess omniscience? If the Christ truly had no idea of when he would return, how then could he give his disciple a time-frame for when he would return (i.e. “Look, I am coming soon!”)? Let us once again remember the words of Aristotle—the truth is that which is able to harmonize all of the evidence.

God is Omnipotent. Jesus was subordinate. Hence, Jesus couldn’t be God! God is necessarily Omnipotent, fully capable of exercising whatever He so wills, for His power encircles everything and beyond. Whereas, human capability is in-essential, derivative and confined. [...] Jesus[p] professing to just that declared: I do nothing on my own but speak just what the Father has taught me. [John 8:28] And he said: I can of mine own self do nothing: as I hear, I judge: and my judgment is just; because I seek not my own will, but the will of the Father which hath sent me. [John 5:30] [...] Jesus’ intention, power, judgment were by-product of God given ability, not by necessity of him-self, as a result; Jesus lacked omnipotence and disqualifies as the Deity. — 6sman (emphasis mine)

Once again the answer is that in his earthly life, Christ limited his free exercise of the divine prerogatives that were rightly his and instead relied solely on his Father. As the Bible declares, “he made himself nothing by taking the very natureof a servant, being made in human likeness. And being found in appearance as a man, he humbled himself.” Once again, we must always interact with all the evidence and when we do so, we find again that the author of the article in question is thoroughly mistaken. Case in point, God’s word is replete with statements which explicitly declare that Jesus Christ, the Son of God, created all things (1 Corinthians 8:6; Colossians 1:15-17, 2:9-11; Hebrews 1:1-3). If Jesus Christ created everything in existence then we can be sure that he is omnipotent because it is only an omnipotent being that can create ex nihilo. Moreover, it is somewhat disingenuous to claim that the Bible portrays Christ as being but a man when one is quoting from a gospel which starts off like this:

¹ In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. ² He was with God in the beginning. ³ Through him all things were made; without him nothing was made that has been made. ⁴In him was life, and that life was the light of all mankind. [...] ¹⁴ The Word became flesh and made his dwelling among us. We have seen his glory, the glory of the one and only Son, who came from the Father, full of grace and truth. — John 1:1-4 & 14 NIV

The Christian claim has always been that Christ is both God and man. This is why one is able to find passages to the effect that Christ quite clearly is a man and yet at the same time find passages which declare that Christ is in fact the One true God Himself. Notice that the opponent of the Christian cannot make sense of these passages where Christ is quite clearly presented as God and as such has to pretend to both himself and his audience that these do not exist in order for his argument to at all work. Yet this is faulty argumentation and even worse, dishonest. It is only the Christian position which can make sense of everything the Bible says concerning Christ and this has been—and continues to be—seen throughout this response to 6sman’s article.

God is Absolute Holiness. Jesus was susceptible. Therefore, Jesus couldn’t be God. Never have I put forward the narrative of Jesus’ satanic temptation sin the wilderness, except that I find Christians tracing their footsteps. In the synoptic Gospels we read: Again, the devil took him to a very high mountain and showed him all the kingdoms of the world and their splendor. “All this I will give you”, he said, “if you will bow down and worship me.” Jesus said to him, “Away from me, Satan! For it is written: ‘Worship the Lord your God,and serve him only.’ “[Mat 4:8-9] Temptation itself is antonym to Divinity, the Bible states so: When tempted, no one should say, “God is tempting me.” For God cannot be tempted by evil, nor does he tempt anyone; but each one is tempted when, by his own evil desire, he is dragged away and enticed. [James 1:13-14] — 6sman (emphasis mine)

I have seen the above argument before and as the reader can probably surmise, it once again relies on ignoring those things which clearly contradict the author’s claims. I won’t go into a discussion on it here because I have already soundly refuted it within this response to a comment posted by someone else on the same subject. Once again, one ought to note the consistency of my argument and how it accounts for all the data while the Muslim argument invariably does not.

Jesus was mortal. God is Immortal. Therefore, God cannot be Jesus! [...] And so a Christian can say: God (Jesus) died for me on the cross, but wait a minute: God, being Immortal and ever-living, cannot die! If it si [sic] said that only the human part of Jesus [p] died then where’s the great sacrifice? [...] Either Jesus[p] wasn’t God (since he died), or he never actually die [sic]. — Ibid. (emphasis mine)

This might seem quite pretentious to the Muslim, that a non-Muslim should be able to speak so decisively concerning their holy text yet given that the Qur’an takes it upon itself to argue against a Christian doctrine, then it isn’t wrong to maintain that Christians are the appropriate judges of whether or not there exists a condemnation of this doctrine within the Muslim holy book. This might perhaps initially sound a tad self-serving yet the same principle would hold if I were to engage in a condemnation of the Islamic concept of Tawhid. No matter what my condemnation of it would consist of, I would first have to define it properly or else I would be attacking nothing but a mere caricature of their doctrine and any reasonably educated Muslim would be able to tell that I spoke concerning things I clearly possessed no understanding of. Just as the learned Muslim is in the best position to know whether one has defined their fundamental doctrine correctly, so too is the learned Christian in the best position to know whether one has defined God’s highest revelation of himself (seeing as the doctrine deals with how he is in his own being) accurately.

Yet therein lies the problem. On being exposed to the passages which the Muslim takes to be a repudiation of the Trinity, the acute Christian can but shake their head and try to explain to his interlocutor that whoever the source of the Qur’an was, this individual clearly possessed no knowledge of the Trinity for they quite clearly fell into the same pitfalls that previous individuals stumbled into and whose interpretations were rightly condemned by the early church. The following will consist of all the references to the Trinity that I have found within the Qur’an and if I have missed any, I would very much like it if I could be let known of this fact seeing as these will surely not change the force of my argument in the least.

O People of the Scripture, do not commit excess in your religion or say about Allah except the truth. The Messiah, Jesus, the son of Mary, was but a messenger of Allah and His word which He directed to Mary and a soul [created at a command] from Him. So believe in Allah and His messengers. And do not say, “Three”; desist — it is better for you. Indeed, Allah is but one God. Exalted is He above having a son. To Him belongs whatever is in the heavens and whatever is on the earth. And sufficient is Allah as Disposer of affairs. — Surah 4:171 Sahih International (emphasis mine)

Dipping right into the matter we see that the People of the Scripture (in this case Christians) are told to desist from saying “three” seeing as this is nothing but lies. It would seem that three stands in place for the trinitarian doctrine of three divine persons. Now we should note the persons involved in the above passage: Allah (who quite clearly is identified with the Father both in the Qur’an and Islamic tradition), Jesus, and Mary. Right from the start we are met with a serious problem. Mary is included in the category of the three divine persons. She is named as a member of the Godhead—of the Trinity while this has never been the case at all. Instead of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, we are treated to the Father, the Mother, and the Son. Hence why the Islamic prophet can later on claim that it is far from God’s glory to have a son seeing as he saw the sonship of Christ as being accomplished through a sexual union between God (the Father) and Mary (the Mother).

They have certainly disbelieved who say that Allah is Christ, the son of Mary. Say, “Then who could prevent Allah at all if He had intended to destroy Christ, the son of Mary, or his mother or everyone on the earth?” And to Allah belongs the dominion of the heavens and the earth and whatever is between them. He creates what He wills, and Allah is over all things competent. — Surah 5:17 Sahih International (emphasis mine)

Once again we have an incorrect formulation of the Christian doctrine. The astute Christian will know that it is fundamentally wrong to say that “God is Jesus”, rather, the declaration is “Jesus is God”. The first statement implies that the Christ is the only divine person within the being of God (to the exclusion of the other members of the Trinity) while the second maintains the divinity of Christ without positing that he is the sole person within the Godhead. This is in much the same way as it is wrong to say “math is division” but entirely correct to say “division is math” seeing as the first statement would teach that math only exists as division and nothing else while the latter does not. More than this simply being a matter of semantics, or obtuse talk entertained only by bored theologians, the phrase “God is Jesus” actually implies the heresy of Sabellianism (Modalism). This was condemned by the early church as a nontrinitarian heresy which removed all distinctions within the being of God and claimed that there was only a single divine person who operated in the modes of the Father, the Son, and the Holy spirit (as opposed to a single divine being who exists eternally as the persons of the three members of the Trinity).

They have certainly disbelieved who say, “Allah is the Messiah, the son of Mary” while the Messiah has said, “O Children of Israel, worship Allah , my Lord and your Lord.” Indeed, he who associates others with Allah — Allah has forbidden him Paradise, and his refuge is the Fire. And there are not for the wrongdoers any helpers. They have certainly disbelieved who say, “Allah is the third of three.” And there is no god except one God. And if they do not desist from what they are saying, there will surely afflict the disbelievers among them a painful punishment. So will they not repent to Allah and seek His forgiveness? And Allah is Forgiving and Merciful. The Messiah, son of Mary, was not but a messenger; [other] messengers have passed on before him. And his mother was a supporter of truth. They both used to eat food. Look how We make clear to them the signs; then look how they are deluded. — Surah 5:72-75 Sahih International (emphasis mine)

Once again the Qur’an incorrectly articulates the doctrine of the divinity of Christ and in fact condemns sabellianism instead of the Trinity. It then goes on to commit a subsequent error in defining the Father’s position as the third member of the Trinity. The Father is not the third but rather the first. And God is not the third of three but rather three in one. These aren’t simple mistakes that we can gloss over when it is claimed that the Qur’an is a book from God. Yet it must be said that both the Christian and Muslim know that the above formulations are wrong seeing as no individual from these two groups who is knowledgeable on the subject will define the Trinity with the Father being the third person or as God being the third of three instead of three in one.

Notice how Mary once more makes an appearance in a passage that is aimed specifically at condemning the Trinity? The source of the Qur’an mentions that Christ and Mary ate food in order to show that they aren’t divine (seeing as God has no need to eat) but they make the great mistake of including Mary in the equation when the context is aimed at condemning the three divine persons whom Christians worship. Once again, the Qur’an is under the impression that the Trinity consists of a Father, a Son (Christ), and Mary (a mother) instead of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit! The text is very clear (“Look how We make clear to them the signs”) that it believes Mary to be part of the Holy Trinity.

And [beware the Day] when Allah will say, “O Jesus, Son of Mary, did you say to the people, ‘Take me and my mother as deities besides Allah ?’” He will say, “Exalted are You! It was not for me to say that to which I have no right. If I had said it, You would have known it. You know what is within myself, and I do not know what is within Yourself. Indeed, it is You who is Knower of the unseen. I said not to them except what You commanded me — to worship Allah , my Lord and your Lord. And I was a witness over them as long as I was among them; but when You took me up, You were the Observer over them, and You are, over all things, Witness. — Surah 5:116-117 Sahih International (emphasis mine)

Let us remember that Muslims accuse Christians of worshiping three separate deities (and as such we are accused of polytheism). Can we count the number of persons involved in the above passage? Once again we have the Father, Christ, and Mary. These three and only these three. There is no subsequent exchange between the Muslim deity and Christ where he asks Jesus if he told his followers to take him and the Holy Spirit as gods beside Allah. That is indeed telling because it is either that the Qur’an is perfectly alright with this, or, more likely, that the source of the Qur’an simply was unaware of what the Trinity truly consisted of. This is a great problem because the above is a purported discussion that Christ will have with Allah when the latter is about to condemn Christians for the apparent errors of their faith. This then clearly shows that the Islamic prophet thought that the Christian religion (in this respect) consisted merely of the worship of Mary and Jesus as gods beside the Father! Where is a condemnation of the worship of the Holy Spirit?

Muslims will often claim that the Trinity was created during the Council of Nicaea in 325 A.D. instead of this having been a doctrine held by the first Christians. Even if this were true, it would still not change the fact that the Islamic prophet would have had hundreds of years to know what Christians in fact believed and there is entirely no excuse for the Qur’an to be making such glaring mistakes.

They have said, “Allah has taken a son.” Exalted is He; He is the [one] Free of need. To Him belongs whatever is in the heavens and whatever is in the earth. You have no authority for this [claim]. Do you say about Allah that which you do not know? — Surah 10:68 Sahih International (emphasis mine)

Once again the bolded claim is an error. The Christian claim is not that the Father took a son but rather that the Father has a son. There is a great theological distinction between the two seeing as the former teaches Adoptionism (Dynamic Monarchianism), another heresy. Taking a son refers to an action occuring in time such that there was a point when God did not have a Son and thus had need to subsequently take for himself a son. Christians believe that the Father has always—from all eternity—had a Son and as such there was never any point at which he could act in order to make Christ his son seeing as the Christ has always been the Son of the Father.

But they have attributed to Allah partners — the jinn, while He has created them — and have fabricated for Him sons and daughters. Exalted is He and high above what they describe. [He is] Originator of the heavens and the earth. How could He have a son when He does not have a companion and He created all things? And He is, of all things, Knowing. — Surah 6:100-101 Sahih International (emphasis mine)

And Exalted is the Majesty of our Lord: He has taken neither a wife nor a son. — Surah 72:3 Yusuf Ali (emphasis mine)

The above logic runs throughout the entire Qur’an. Muhammad lumped Christians and polytheists together in this regard and believed that Christians merely repeated the same myths as the polytheists; that is, God being able to enter into a sexual union with a consort and thus producing offspring thereby. From the Qur’an it is very clear that Allah can have no son because he has no wife to engage in intercourse with. This is rather crude but this is precisely why the Muslim holy book is so focused on not only disproving the divinity of Christ, but that of Mary as well (as if Christians ever claimed that Mary was divine)!

As if this weren’t enough, the Qur’an consistently speaks of the sonship of Christ in terms that imply a biological sonship:

They say: “Allah hath begotten a son”: Glory be to Him.—Nay, to Him belongs all that is in the heavens and on earth: everything renders worship to Him. — Surah 2:116 Yusuf Ali

Transliteration: Waqaloo itakhatha Allahuwaladan subhanahu bal lahu ma fee assamawatiwal-ardi kullun lahu qanitoon (emphasis mine)

—————

It befits not (the Majesty of) Allah that He should beget a son [this refers to the slander of Christians against Allah, by saying that 'Iesa (Jesus) is the son of Allah]. Glorified (and Exalted be He above all that they associate with Him). When He decrees a thing, He only says to it, “Be!” and it is. — Surah 19:35 Muhsin Khan

Transliteration: Ma kana lillahi anyattakhitha min waladin subhanahu itha qadaamran fa-innama yaqoolu lahu kun fayakoon (emphasis mine)

In Arabic, ibn and walad can both stand for ‘son of’ yet ibn carries a more figurative meaning while the latter implies one’s progeny from a sexual union. This is why the Arabic Bible and Arabic Christians never call Christ, ‘waladu’llah‘ (Son of God) for this would imply a literal sonship accomplished through biology, but rather ‘ibnu’llah‘ (Son of God). The Qur’an uses language which always implies literal sonship except in one passage, Surah 9:30. The problem however is that seeing as ibn could also refer to a biological son (depending on the context), this one instance ought to be interpreted in light of the entire Qur’an and the Muslim scriptures are quite clear that they understand the sonship of Christ as being achieved through a sexual union between God and Mary.

Yet we can certainly understand how the Islamic prophet would arrive at such a mistake. In his travels as a merchant he no doubt would have, in some form or other, come into contact with the doctrine of the Theotokos—the God-bearer, which stated that Mary was the mother of God in the respect of her being the mother of Christ (as it concerns his humanity) and Christ himself being the one true God. To this day some Muslims still believe that this has to do with bringing the Second Person of the Trinity into existence (as opposed to giving birth to his humanity) and since they know that Christians believe Christ to be God it then isn’t hard to suppose—when one possesses an inadequate conception of this teaching—that the Father and Mary (the mother) entered into a physical union (see here) in order to produce Christ (the Son). If this misconception is still subscribed to in this day and age where the information to the contrary is freely available, how much more likely is it for a 7th century Bedouin (who himself could neither read nor write) to have fallen into the same misunderstanding? This point is even further emphasized when we appreciate the fact that Theotokos would translate to Arabic as Wālidat Alelah and we know that walad carries in its meaning a literal sonship—which is perfectly appropriate for it regards Christ’s humanity but Muhammad must have heard walidat and immediately thought of a divine son produced through the sexual union of a Father-god and a Mother-goddess. As an aside, we should note that what would make this interpretation even more likely is the fact that save for in one instance, the Qur’an always uses ibn when calling Jesus, “the son of Mary” and this no doubt highlights the great dislike that the source of the Qur’an held for the term, walad.

Now, it has been my experience that the Muslim might still object to this on the basis of Surah 9:30 alone and as such it would prove adequate to show how even this objection is untenable. Here is Surah 9:30:

The Jews say, “Ezra is the son of Allah”; and the Christians say, “The Messiah is the son of Allah.” That is their statement from their mouths; they imitate the saying of those who disbelieved [before them]. May Allah destroy them; how are they deluded? — Sahih International (emphasis mine)

Note that the force of the argument is the fact that the Christians and Jews are said to imitate the myths of those who came before them. This clearly refers to the polytheists who believed their Gods to have been capable of engaging in sexual intercourse with divine consorts or mortal women. The fact that every time that the “three gods” whom Christians supposedly worship are enumerated, Mary makes an appearance (and as such the list always consists of a father, a mother and a son), only augments this point. We cannot ignore the fact that the worship of the Holy Spirit as a member of the Trinity is never condemned in the Qur’an. The Muslim holy book claims that Christians worship three deities and yet every passage which details the three individuals whom Christians worship mentions Mary as one of these.

The Muslim Response:

There are a few different ways in which the Muslim will try to respond and yet all these do nothing to mitigate the clear errors within their Qur’an. First off, the Muslim may point to the Catholic practise of venerating Mary (Note that this does nothing to answer why the Qur’an—in believing itself to be speaking against the Trinity—mistakenly condemns various heresies, and confounds the order of the Persons in the Holy Trinity etc.). While I do not wish to defend this practise, it must be said that Catholics do not consider Mary to be divine and have never included her as one of the three members of the Trinity. The matter that the Muslim needs to explain to the astute Christian is how at all the Qur’an can accuse Christians of worshiping ”three gods” and yet always enumerate a list that does not include the Holy Spirit and substitutes Mary for him. Make no mistake about it, there are exactly zero condemnations of the worship of the Holy spirit within the Qur’an. If Muhammad had wished to condemn the veneration of Mary as well as the Trinity then he would have had to at least posit a quadrinity in which he condemned the worship of the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit and the mother of Christ.

The second response is to try to claim that the Qur’an was only condemning a certain group. Note that this reply does nothing to explain away the errors concerning the Trinity within the Muslim holy book (such as Sabellianism, Adoptionism, or confounding the persons of the Blessed Trinity). Furthermore, the Qur’an consistently says “the Christians” instead of “some Christians, a few Christians”, or even “a majority of the Christians”. Nowhere does one get the sense that the source of the Qur’an is speaking of a particular Christian sect and not Christians as a whole. For example, I could not claim  (and do so repeatedly without any clarification at all) that Muslims are in error for believing that W. Fard Muhammad is the incarnation of God. The majority of Muslims do not believe this and it is only a fringe group (the Nation of Islam) who propagate such a belief. Yet if I never even once clarified that I was speaking about an aberrant Muslim sect, the objective individual would have to conclude that I simply supposed all Muslims to believe the same thing as those comprising the Nation of Islam. This then is the problem we find with the Islamic holy book. Considering that Muslims claim the Qur’an to be a miraculous book exhibiting a perfect mastery of language it does seem rather strange that it would word its supposed intentions so clumsily. If there really did exist such a group whom the Qur’an was speaking against, then even this would be an argument against the divine inspiration of Muhammad seeing as he supposed that all Christians followed such a group (given that in every single instance when such a practice is repudiated, there is absolutely nothing to make one believe that the Islamic prophet was not speaking of Christians as a whole). It’s like only having come into contact with members of the Nation of Islam and thus supposing that all Muslims believed that W. Fard Muhammad was the incarnation of Allah (as I did when I was quite young and knew no better).

An ingenuous response is to claim that current Christians have changed their Trinity and that at some point Mary had been the third person of the Godhead instead of the Holy Spirit. (Once again this fails to make up for the errors within the Qur’an where it condemns well-known heresies instead of the Trinity and confounds the order of the Persons of the Godhead). This claim is baseless yet let us at this time concede this point for the sake of the argument, this would still not change the fact that by the time Muhammad would be preaching his condemnations of what he mistakenly thought to be the Christian Trinity, this doctrine had been firmly established and defined. Even if at some distant point in the past Mary had been displaced from the Trinity and replaced with the Holy Spirit, in the time of Muhammad however, the Trinity would be the same one which Christians adhere to today and as such the condemnations uttered by the Islamic prophet would still be in error.

In recent years, some Muslims have even begun to claim that none of the above actually speak about the Trinity and that they merely speak against the supposed deification of Christ and his mother. We must reiterate that such a claim is false and that were it true, even this would not explain away the errors in articulating the divinity of Christ, the order of the persons within the Trinity etc. Not to mention that if Muhammad had merely wished to speak against the setting up of partners beside God, why then is the Qur’an silent on the worship of the Holy Spirit? Why is it that the Muslim cannot produce even a single verse from their holy book which condemns the worship of the Holy Spirit seeing as Muslims believe him to have been merely the angel Gabriel? Clearly this attempt to answer the objections laid out by the Christian also fails.

Another response is to claim that all of the above is merely semantics. This is usually followed by a period and no further argumentation. In a way it is not really a response but more of a plea. Given that there is literally no way to vindicate the Qur’an on the matter, the devout Muslim has to find any reason to try to disregard the above. Once more this response is inadequate because history tells us that Christians took the proper formulation of the Trinity seriously enough to condemn these other heresies. Members on both sides were adamant that their articulations were in fact teaching different things and as such this issue cannot simply be swept under the rug as merely a matter of semantics. History is against this.

Now, we must not at all be surprised that Muhammad was mistaken concerning the Blessed Trinity for it truly is a hard doctrine to understand, much less articulate properly. We find that the Islamic prophet commits the very same mistakes as did individuals before him (and after him) yet this cannot excuse him as he claimed that his were the words of God. Individuals who did not adhere to the Trinity have in the past (as in the present) been able to articulate the doctrine of the Trinity properly and then proceeded to attack it from there and so should we believe that the omniscient God himself would be unable to do the same? The Muslim might be able to argue their way out of one or two examples, but when all the passages concerning the Trinity are examined in unison, the evidence is so overwhelmingly against them that it simply becomes impossible to do so. It is my sincere belief that the learned Muslim knows the Qur’an to be wrong on this account given that they will never articulate the Trinity in the manner that it is found in the Qur’an. That in itself is extremely telling.

In closing, we must once again assert that there is no condemnation of the Christian Trinity within the Qur’an and the Islamic prophet merely mistakenly condemned heresies which trinitarians themselves had condemned hundreds of years before he begun spreading his message of Islam. Furthermore, not a single Muslim response to this article can account for the various types of errors which the Islamic prophet makes in his career concerning Christian doctrine and as such they all fail. It is easy for the Muslim to think that the Qur’an repudiates the Holy Trinity for, by and large, they are unschooled in Christian history and as such are unable to pick up on the mistakes and heresies which are repeated in the Qur’an.

It must first be said that there does seem to be an inherent incoherence within Islam on the subject given that the Muslim deity seems to declare one thing, yet acts in a manner that is in complete contrast to his promise(s). In our case, this is best exemplified in the story of the Islamic prophet Nuh (the Qur’an’s version of the biblical Noah). As in the biblical account, Noah is chosen by God to build the Ark which would save him from the flood and as he does so, he preaches of the impending doom to whomever will listen:

And indeed We sent Nuh (Noah) to his people (and he said): I have come to you as a plain warner. That you worship none but Allah, surely, I fear for you the torment of a painful Day. [...] And it was inspired to Nuh (Noah): None of your people will believe except those who have believed already. So be not sad because of what they used to do. And construct the ship under Our Eyes and with Our Inspiration, and address Me not on behalf of those who did wrong; they are surely to be drowned. And as he was constructing the ship, whenever the chiefs of his people passed by him, they made a mockery of him. He said: If you mock at us, so do we mock at you likewise for your mocking. And you will know who it is on whom will come a torment that will cover him with disgrace and on whom will fall a lasting torment. (So it was) till then there came Our Command and the oven gushed forth (water like fountains from the earth). We said: Embark therein, of each kind two (male and female), and your family, except him against whom the Word has already gone forth, and those who believe. And none believed with him, except a few. — Surah 11:25-26; 36-40 Muhsin Khan (emphasis mine)

Where the Islamic account mainly differs from the one in the Bible, is in the fact that according to Muhammad, the flood was due to the polytheism of Noah’s people while the Bible says that it was due to all the evil that was in man’s heart. The Islamic Noah makes this quite clear:

And they have said: ‘You shall not leave your gods, nor shall you leave Wadd, nor Suwa’, nor Yaghuth, nor Ya’uq, nor Nasr (names of the idols); And indeed they have led many astray. And (O Allah): ‘Grant no increase to the Zalimun (polytheists, wrong-doers, and disbelievers, etc.) save error. Because of their sins they were drowned, then were made to enter the Fire, and they found none to help them instead of Allah. — Surah 71:23-25 Muhsin Khan (emphasis mine)

What is particularly of note are the sentences that I have bolded in that they both claim that the flood is the punishment for those who have done wrong. This then naturally leads one to ask, who else died in the flood? Seeing as the Islamic text claims that it was only Noah and a few other believers who were saved, it is uncontroversial to claim that the majority of mankind succumbed to this divine judgement. Now if indeed the flood was to punish the polytheists, was it only the guilty party who drowned (as the Qur’an seems to claim)? Clearly the answer is no seeing as it goes without saying that children who would not yet know right from wrong and whom much less could even commit the sin of idolatry were present at the time of the deluge. This fact then creates a problem for the Muslim. According to the Qur’an, the punishment was reserved for the polytheists yet reason leads us to the conclusion that it was not only these individuals who died but persons whom were entirely innocent as well (seeing as the same narrative tells us that only a few were saved with no mention of Noah rounding up all of the children on earth).

If then one is punished for the sins of another, does it not follow that this sin has been imputed onto them? It only makes logical sense to suppose so, for how else could someone be even wrongly punished if in the eyes of the one who imposes the punishment, this individual did not have some part in the sin in the first place?

At this point I’m compelled to apportion a small section within this article to contrast the brutality of the Muslim deity with the righteousness of Yahweh given that both Christians and Muslim believe in the flood of Noah and acknowledge that a numerous amount of people—both adult and mere children—drowned. I will not write too much on the matter save to say that while in Islam, the deity punishes countless number of people for sins that they have not committed and in fact are entirely sinless; the biblical account is one in which everyone has sins and as such no righteous person died in the flood. “For all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God” (Rom. 3:23) and as such it is not the case that punishment had been dealt unjustly. While it may not be particularly pleasing (and God himself dislikes to engage in it. He calls it his “strange work” in Isaiah 28:21-22 to emphasize just how alien it is to what he really desires for every man and woman), the punishment of sinners is wholly in keeping with a holy God. One does not have to believe this, or even like it but if we are to judge Christianity on the basis of its claims then it could not be said that God acted immorally. The same cannot be said of the Muslim deity for he quite clearly punishes the righteous for the sins of the unrighteous and this simply does not make any sense given what Allah claims of himself and the system of Islam entirely (that is, the lack of original sin etc.). His actions are not unlike the atrocities which the ancients used to commit regularly:

If a man struck the pregnant daughter of another so that she miscarried and died, his own daughter must be put to death. A seducer must deliver his wife to the seduced girl’s father for prostitution. In another class are penalties which involve the substitution of a dependent for the offerer — the Hittite laws compelling a slayer to deliver so many persons to the kinsmen of the slain, or prescribing that a man who has pushed another into a fire must give over his son… — (A Song of Power and the Power of Song, 295)

One sees the same principle as in the above quote, exemplified in the Muslim deity’s actions. According to Islam, Allah’s actions are not unlike the above and in the same way that we are incensed, repulsed, and in disbelief of the above—rather, far greater—for we can understand the above and in some ways expect it of primitive societies, but we could certainly not accept it from the embodiment of justice itself. Islam presents us with a deity who acts not at all dissimilar to sinful humanity. Once again we must comprehend the fact that according to Christianity, never once are the innocent punished along with the guilty, but according to Islam the innocent are regularly punished for the sins of the guilty. That is, if Allah is just, moreover, if Allah is justice personified and if this same Justice claims that children are sinless, it should therefore follow that he could not even in principle end their earthly lives through death for that would be thoroughly unjust.

It should be noted however that our question does not concern the salvation of the children but whether it was appropriate for them to have been punished in the first place? Both Muslims and Christians will readily admit that these children were admitted into heaven and this is not our point of contention. Therefore, an objection on the premise of the salvation of the children not only fails to grasp the argument but is in fact wholly immoral. We cannot do evil so that good may come (Romans 3:5-8)—no matter what the result of evil may be, evil will remain evil and will be judged as such, irrespective of its results. This is perhaps most poignantly exemplified in Ursula K. LeGuin’s short story, The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas. It is as destructive towards Islam as it is for proponents of utilitarianism as the (only) appropriate moral philosophy that individuals should subscribe to.

Now to return to our point, if the claims within the Qur’an are at all to be believed then we are forced to acknowledge that Allah punished these individuals for the sins of others and in so doing imputed them with a sin that was never their own. This then becomes quite ironic given that Muslims are quick to decry Christ’s vicarious atonement as unjust seeing as an individual should not be punished for the sins of another yet here we have the Muslim deity doing the same thing on a global scale! So given this understanding on the part of Muslims, it is therefore only logical to conclude that Muslims believe their deity to commit actions which are wholly immoral (and in fact are indeed immoral given the lack of original sin within the system of Islam as a ‘work-around’ the claim that the punishment is unjust). These are not my words (though I certainly do agree with them), but rather the words of Muslims themselves.

To begin with, Hasan sees the problem I had brought out with the term ‘slave’ and so he tries to mitigate this by claiming that Allah does not call Muslims his slaves but rather his servants. He says:

You are quoting one of the ‘many’ translations found… Here is from the one I follow, plus you have left out the most important part [...] Allah is asking His ‘servants’ to take Him only as their protector, I don’t have to tell you the difference between a servant and a slave.

There are many different problems that we can mention right at the start, the least of which is that most Muslims are adamant that they are in fact the slaves of Allah. One need only to enter the term in a search engine to find numerous websites which seek to show how the Muslim can be a proper slave of Allah. Moreover, what is interesting about this is the complete lack of any debate to the contrary. Why is it that this term seems to be agreed upon by most Muslims? Where are the middle eastern scholars who disagree with the phrase ‘slave of Allah’ and would rather substitute this with ‘servant of Allah’? Even when searching for the phrase ‘Muslims are not the slaves of Allah’ we receive no hits but rather more of the same agreed upon belief that Muslims are in fact Allah’s slaves. It is then more than obvious that Hasan introduces such a distinction only as a means of trying to avoid the ramifications of my point.

Yet it is more than apparent that such an arbitrary distinction fails to make his point for four reasons: ( 1 ) because Allah does in fact refer to his people as slaves; ( 2 ) because real debate on the matter of this distinction is not present in historical Islam nor even present-day Islam; ( 3 ) because Islam does not actually subscribe to a distinction between ‘servant’ and ‘slave’ when these are used in respect to the property of Allah; ( 4 ) because even if such a real distinction were present, the ramifications of my argument would still apply and contrary to what Hasan sought to prevent, the Muslim deity would still come up significantly short, in comparison to Yahweh. Yet let us speak more on the subject of some of these points.

( 1 ) I had said that Allah does indeed call his people his slaves and Hasan claimed that I was mistaken on this account. Therefore, let us simply examine the use of the word ‘abd within the Qur’an.

How the word ‘Ibada and its variants are used in the Qur’an?

-In 2:178, the word ‘abd has been used to mean slave or servant as an opposite of free person

-In 2:221 and 24:32, the word ‘abd has been used to mean ‘male’ slave or servant as an opposite of a ‘female’ slave or servant
-In 16:75, the word ‘abd has been used to mean ‘a slave’ {owned by someone, who has no power over anything}

-In 2:23, 8:41, 17:1, 18:1, 25:1 53:10, 57:9, 72:19 Allah has called the Prophet Muhammad (a.s.), His ‘abd

-In 4:172, the word ‘abd-Allah has been used for Al-Maseeh (a.s.)

-In 18:65-82, an account of one of Allah’s ‘abd and the Prophet Musa (a.s.) is given

-In 19:2, the Prophet Zakariya (a.s.) has been called ‘abd

-In 19:30 and 43:59, the Prophet Isa (a.s.) has been called ‘abd
-In 38:17, the Prophet Dawood (a.s.) has been called ‘abd —The Qur’anic Teachings (click the link for more examples)

Now, it is either through deceit or plain ignorance that Hasan made the claim that Allah does not in fact call Muslims his slaves. It is telling that the quotes above are concerning prophets. In Islam, the greatest position a human can achieve is that of being a prophet of Allah and so for Allah to bless these greatest of men merely with the title of slave speaks volumes.

( 3 ) This then leads us to the third point. In the example above we saw that ‘abd could refer to a slave or a servant but either way, the contexts made it quite clear that the individual spoken of was not a free man. In our English language, there is a difference between being a servant and a slave. While any man could be considered the servant of a King, the servant differs from the slave in that he is a free man. Yet in the Qur’an’s use of the word, ‘abd is in opposition to a free man and as such it does not designate ‘servant’ in our sense of the word. To translate ‘abd as servant is not wrong per se, but the manner in which it has been used in Islamic scripture plainly shows that ‘slave’ and ‘servant’ are interchangeable as it regards the property of Allah and that in the understanding of the Qur’an, they both denote an individual who is not free. As such, the best English equivalent which at present captures the full scope of understanding that the 7th century Muslim (and even present-day Muslims) would have possessed when coming across the word ‘abd, is indeed the word ‘slave’. When the Muslim translator uses the word ‘servant’ they really do mean ‘slave’, but it is merely that the former sounds better than the latter when presenting Islam to an English speaking audience.

( 2 ) This is why there is no uproar caused by translations which use ‘servant’ instead of ‘slave’ for they both can mean the same thing and while using one instead of the other might make a certain demographic view the Qur’an in a better light, it does stave off reproaches by fellow Muslims seeing as the two words can be used to express the same idea and are in fact meant to by the translators (similar to how some modern-day translations substitute the word ‘God’ for ‘Allah’ though this is not without it’s share of controversy).

( 4 ) Yet let us suppose that, regarding Allah’s property, the Qur’an did in fact subscribe to a distinction between the words slave and servant (which as a side note would suddenly open up a whole new can of worms in the form of two theologically divergent, yet seemingly equally valid, Qur’ans), would this save Islam from the ramifications of the argument? No, seeing as the parent-child relationship is still far more excellent in love then that of the Master-servant relationship. His attempt would still result in Muslims giving to Allah, and Allah giving to Muslims something which is completely substandard. Therefore, the argument stills stands.

It seems your study of Islam is premitive. Praying (i.e. showing love towards Allah) is only a small part of attributing towards Goodness. The greater good is helping humanity, doing charity, caring for others selflessly. Islamic traditions have it that a prostitute was blessed with heaven only because once she helped a limping dog who was thirsty and hungry for two days. If you read Qura’an you will see Allah commands us to do most of the service towards humanity. It is Islam which exalted the status of women, pre-Islam, Arab Jews and Christians burried their new born daughters alive. — Hasan

There are two things that I would like to address with the above. The first being the example of the prostitute, and then second being that charge that Jews and Christians used to bury their women in pre-Islamic Arabia.

Now, I think that with the matter of the prostitute, Hasan sought to present Allah as wholly loving and I must admit that admitting a prostitute into heaven merely for giving a limping dog water to drink is rather nice and is certainly a story one would tell to arouse a warm, fuzzy feeling in themselves and their listener but would such an action be just? See, I have argued in another post that Islam has an inherent problem with the balance of justice, mercy and forgiveness that Allah allots to his creatures and this example by Hasan serves to once more bring the matter to the forefront.

Notice that in the example the woman is let into heaven only because of that single good deed that she committed. Muslims claim that one’s good deeds must outweight one’s bad deeds in order to enter heaven. Therefore, while the individual who committed 49.9999999% good deeds would not enter heaven, the individual who committed 50.000001% good deeds would (how good in fact are you if you have only committed 50.000001% good deeds in your life and what real difference is there between the two individuals mentioned? This subject is actually fairly fascinating when one begins to think of actual concrete examples and what these say about Allah, but I digress) in fact save themselves from hell. Yet in Hasan’s example, it is merely that single deed which saves the woman from hell and so we ought to ask ourselves, given that the Qur’an claims that heaven is gained through a balance of good deeds versus bad deeds, how is it that the prostitute could at all find herself in heaven? Where is the sense of justice in that? Now a likely rejoinder would be that that one single act was filled with such kindness and love that it outweighed all her other sins yet this still leaves us with a problem. According to Islam, individuals who have done far more for the world, in a far greater manner, for a far greater number of persons, with the same if not far greater emphasis in love and kindness will find themselves in hell. If one act of giving a mere dog water to drink can save one’s soul, on what basis can Allah justly consign these other individuals to hell?

If we read Hasan’s words carefully it is that single act and only that single act which saved that prostitute and so how can Allah send these others to hell and still claim to be just? Why then should Muslims at all bother to engage in da’wah if Allah is so merciful that a single act of kindness will lead one to heaven? Haven’t we all at least committed one true act of kindness, and if this is not enough to warrant heaven for us then why was it enough for a prostitute (who in retrospect has probably committed far greater sins than the majority of us)? Where is the justice? Clearly, as I had mentioned in my other post, Islam has a drastic problem with the issue of forgiving sin. Part of this stems from the fact that as with utilitarianism, it turns morality into a game of numbers and such an approach just doesn’t work. It comes off as extremely juvenile and when one begins to try to crunch the actual numbers, the whole system unravels and is exposed for the sham that it is. The emperor has no clothes.

As it regards the second argument I need but say that this is untrue. Even his own Islamic history documents this as being the polytheists of Muhammad’s day and not the Christians or Jews who were the one’s that were burying their women. Could Hasan give us the theological reasons for why these Christians or Jews would do so (especially seeing as the Judeo-Christian scriptures do not advocate anything of the sort)? And perhaps more importantly, why it is that these same groups in various other lands did not engage in the same practise? Yet even this answer is not thorough enough for it is an oft-repeated myth that pre-Islamic Arabia was such a devilish place where the Arabs used to bury their women yet this isn’t a particularly honest picture.

Before the advent of Islam, the pagan Arab women generally enjoyed a respectable status in society; many of them including Khadija – the first wife of the prophet of Islam, had the right to engage in business and choose or dismiss their husbands in a matrilineal fashion; they took part in most activities of war and peace including public worship. [...] Arab pagan poetry was mostly concerned with the beauty and grace of their women, and the glory of their tribal values in peace and war. And it was only in one predator tribe of Mecca that the evil custom of burying alive of the daughters prevailed. — Dr. Younus Shaikh

While Muslims will readily tell you that Khadija was a fairly rich woman and managed her father’s business interests etc. they also will readily forget this and the things that this fact actually informs us  of (e.g. the status of women in pre-Islamic times etc.) when speaking of how much Islam improved Arabia. While I do not mean to say that Islam did not bring some good things to Arabia, it would not do to pretend as if all that which Islam brought with it were improvements or good.

You missed my point entirely, if the Christian God was all knowing and a ‘supreme planner’, why is he acting like a clumsy parent, not to mention a clumsy planner too. When it comes to the character of God, I for once believe He is the all knowing and supreme in his planning, He does not ‘change’ / ‘regret’ what He has created, everything that He has created has a purpose. — Hasan

It had been argued that God’s punishment on Adam, creation and Eve in particular was not loving. I countered this opinion and showed how the argument actually only applied to Islam to which Hasan replied with the above. I do not particularly know what Hasan means by clumsy parent, but I at least can answer the objection from the fact that God regretted having created mankind. Let us at this time understand that the Bible oftentimes uses anthropomorphic language to describe God:

The anthropomorphism of the Israelites was an attempt to express the nonrational aspects of religious experience (the mysterium tremendum, “aweful majesty,” discussed by Rudolf Otto) in terms of the rational, and the early expressions of it were not as “crude” as so-called enlightened man would have one think. The human characteristics of Israel’s God were always exalted, while the gods of their Near Eastern neighbors shared the vices of men. Whereas the representation of God in Israel never went beyond anthropomorphism, the gods of the other religions assumed forms of animals, trees, stars, or even a mixture of elements. Anthropomorphic concepts were “absolutely necessary if the God of Israel was to remain a God of the individual Israelite as well as of the people as a whole…. For the average worshipper…it is very essential that his god be a divinity who can sympathize with his human feelings and emotions, a being whom he can love and fear alternately, and to whom he can transfer the holiest emotions connected with memories of father and mother and friend” — W. F. Albright (From the Stone Age to Christianity, 2nd ed., p. 202)

These descriptions need not be taken literally but neither should they be easily discounted seeing as they reveal very real truths about God (his person and character). The fact that the sin of mankind caused God to ‘regret’ having created man actually highlights something very important: that God is a moral agent. Regret (among other things) is what makes us moral characters and it does not necessarily denote an inferiority in being, knowledge nor purpose.

For example, I may very well know that in the coming days, months, years, I will come across articles in the news that will upset me very much and highlight how the human race as a whole repeatedly fails to live up to the standard that God calls us towards but the fact that I know this beforehand should not cause me to become indifferent when, inevitably, these things come to my attention. In fact, to be indifferent based on some prior knowledge, or whatever else, would be wholly wrong and immoral. It is the duty of a moral agent to be outraged by evil, to feel sadness at loss, and to weep with the broken—the claim that it is better for God to somehow remain aloof and not empathize with the feelings of his creation is preposterous and moreover, nefarious. I cannot claim to be loving and remain unaffected by human suffering, by evil etc. Rather it is those whom are most affected by this and who “mourn with those who mourn” that we honour most—Christ, Mother Teresa, and various others humanitarian figures who have been hurt by the brokenness of this world and thereby have been driven to change it. That our sins cause regret in God is rather a testament to his holiness, righteousness and love.

A Muslim may vaguely admit that the Muslim deity “defends the cause of the fatherless and the widow, and loves the alien, giving him food and clothing” (Psalm 68:5), but they certainly do not know what these words really mean. The Muslim does not understand, in fact cannot understand, the God who’s heart is overwhelmed with compassion for his people (Hosea 11:8), the God who is so enamored with his children that he sings over them (Zephaniah 3:17), the God who loves without first being loved (1 John 4:9-10). All these things are incomprehensible to the Muslim because they are accustomed to a deity who exemplifies none of these. This is why the Muslim is so shocked by a God who behaves like a truly moral agent for most Muslims believe Allah to be amoral:

His holiness has nothing to do with him having to die for the sins of humanity. No one has claimed that the Christian god is not holy. In fact, a holy god would not belittle himself, and die for the sins of his own creation, when he can easily forgive them since he is all powerful, and is not bound by any morals that human beings must operate under. — Ruwayda Mustafa (emphasis mine)

Once more, Islam gives lip-service to the ideals we know to be true and good yet actually repudiates these in its philosophy by not embodying these in God. The Muslim says: “Sure, there is no more excellent relationship than that of the parent-child dynamic, but when it comes to God it is the master-slave relationship which is better. Sure to be affected by what happens in the world is wonderful and absolutely right while to do the opposite would be wholly depraved, but for God it is better if he remains indifferent and aloof. Sure being bound to morals is what makes an individual righteous but God couldn’t possibly be bound by anything much less morals so to be amoral is better”. Notice how Islam repudiates all these blessings by not grounding them in God? If it is unfit to his perfection that he should exhibit moral agency, that he should exhibit the highest form of love etc. then what at all is the worth of these things? Let me try to state this in a different manner: “if God were not good then what at all would be the worth of goodness?” Sure we would perhaps still be able to choose goodness yet we could have no coherent rational reason to prefer it over evil and as such goodness would not be ‘good’ in the full sense of the word. Goodness therefore would become merely the arbitrary opinion of the will and of no transcendental value—the same holds true for moral agency, the love in a family etc.

While I do not wish to spend too much time on the following point, I should mention that Allah does indeed change what he creates:

The Holy Prophet said: ‘The believer will be given such and such strength in Paradise for sexual intercourse. It was questioned: O prophet of Allah! can he do that? He said: “He will be given the strength of one hundred persons. — Mishkat al-Masabih Book IV, Chapter XLII, Paradise and Hell, Hadith Number 24 (emphasis mine)

Hasan knows quite well that the above is the case yet in his argument he is quick to deny that the Muslim deity takes it upon himself to change what he has called into being. Now, the fact that God could change what he has created isn’t a problem in itself and doesn’t actually say all that much for better or worse. I only highlight it to show either the complete ignorance that Hasan possesses of his own religion or the deception that he is employing in his argumentation.

It is simple logic, do you need Allah to ‘dictate’ how much He loves his creation? Allah has no ‘regrets’ whatsoever, if He wanted, all the non-believers will perish in a moment. But that is not happening, what does that tell you? If a child hates his mother and goes far away from her, the mother still loves her child and hopes he will someday come back to her, while a human mother might at a certain point regret giving birth to such a child, God does not, God has let man free to decide his own fate. — Hasan.

The above is a response to my objection that Allah does not in fact love everyone. What should first be noted is that Hasan’s response is not based on the Qur’an at all, he does not cite even a single surah for the fact that there are none to be found in the entire Muslim holy book to such an effect. It shouldn’t escape the reader that Hasan is saying things about his deity that they have never said (either implicitly or explicitly) for themselves. Allah is quite specific in those individuals whom he does not love and has dictated a list that includes all non-Muslims. Furthermore, the example which Hasan uses is in itself blasphemous. The only relationship that Allah has with his creation in the Qur’an is that of a master-slave dynamic. In fact, the Qur’an repudiates the idea that Allah could be seen as a parent (Surat Al-Mā’idah 5:18) and nowhere actually calls himself the Father, Mother or Parent of any of his creations! The above is pure fabrication when it comes to Islam and actually finds its source in the Judeo-Christian understanding of God! If one were to follow the link and read the section entitled “Tafsir Jalalayn”, they’d understand that even the Muslim commentators understood Surah 5:18 as a direct rejection of the very Judeo-Christian conception of God which Hasan would now wish to espouse. I stress that the reader have read my original article to understand why the point of who Allah loves, when Allah begins to love, and how Allah loves is so damaging to the Muslim position. As anyone can see, the author is unable to vindicate the Muslim deity on the basis of Islam and thus has to use the biblical understanding of God to make up for the failings of Islam.

What you are forgetting is the same will apply to Christian God too, natural disasters kill thousands of ‘Christians’, is that fair? Natural disasters are brought upon nations who go too far in their rebellion. If you can justify the ‘murder’ of the Christians by their own Lord I am sure I can too. Besides, you didn’t answer my questions about deformities in Chiristian families. — Ibid.

Hasan seems to misunderstand the Christian doctrine of Original Sin. According to Christianity, the world is not as it should be and due to the sin of Adam and Eve, nature and humanity was drastically changed. With this change came all the ails and disasters that the world suffers from today—this was not what God had intended for the world but rather the result of the free will he gave to his creation. In using their wills to rebel against God Adam and Eve broke away from the source of all goodness and life and inevitably welcomed evil and death. This is the reason for the suffering that we are faced with today, not because of God, but wholly because of man. Yet even these God manages to use for his purpose. That is, even though we have ruined the idyllic world we had been bestowed, God, in his sovereign wisdom, has chosen to reconcile creation to himself through this very ruin. Such that even the evil we have brought into this world can be used to accomplish some good in the overall context of salvation history. Hence why even Christians suffer misfortune because, while God never intended that these should happen, he is able to use even these for realization of his redemptive plan (Romans 8:28). According to Christianity, it isn’t God who brought about natural disasters, deformities, disabilities and the like, but rather mankind. Yet in Islam, this picture is completely reversed. In Islam, it is the Muslim deity who actively  brought about natural disasters to consume creation even after he claimed to have forgiven them. Furthermore, it was always his intention that the whole of creation should suffer in the manner that it does—there was no initial deviance from the plan that brought about our miserable condition.

In Christianity, we bear the burden of sin and hence why misfortunes such as earthquakes or being born unhealthy arise. Not because God had at some point wished for this to happen but rather because at some point man had chosen to break with his Creator. Therefore, deformities do indeed happen because all are sinners and bear the burden of sin within themselves. Sin is prevalent in our nature and the effects of sin manifest themselves in the world through many different ways, one of these being physical deformities. In Islam however, there was no drastic change to our constitution and it is not sin which brings about that children are born with deformities (either mental or physical) but rather it is the active will of Allah who makes this happen.

It now occurs to me that my words can be easily mistaken to imply that, for instance, birth-deformities are due to the sins of the individual themselves and that is false. In fact, Christ repudiated such an idea (John 9:1-3). What I mean by ‘burden of sin’ is our general fallen state due to the sin of Adam. Just as a parent passes down their biological traits to their children, so has Adam passed down his sin nature to his descendants. Everyone possesses this sin nature and this is precisely why neither I nor you dear reader can say that they have never sinned—in fact, we find it so much harder to do good than to sin. Sinning comes naturally to us while we have to strive very hard to be free from it. Now to return to the point: given that we are all the descendants of Adam, it follows that we have all inherited this sin nature and with sin comes imperfection. It is the case that this imperfection sometimes also manifests itself in the form of birth deformities. This is not because God actively wills for children to be born deformed, but rather because imperfection has become part of the human condition and hence the possibility for cells to replicate imperfectly and for deformities to happen. Imperfection has also become part of the general creation and this is mainly why disease, and natural disasters occur—once again not because God desired that these should be part of the world he created but rather because when man first transgressed his law, they allowed imperfection into the world.

Now Muslims do see the evil and injustice in the above; hence why they will try to soften this fact by claiming that this is a test from God. Yet this makes little to no sense. For example, if I wished to test one’s resolve to stay away from drugs (for our example, let us suppose that the drug in question is one of the more addictive ones) I could go so far as to place the individual in a position where they would be forced to make the choice whether to imbibe the drug or not, but never would I make them addicted to it a priori (perhaps by incorporating it within their meals without their knowledge) and then test them to see how long they could function without this foreign substance. Another way of putting this is that I could never in good conscience allow an individual to experience the effects of a drug (i.e. becoming intoxicated) in order to test their resolve seeing as, for one thing, this would be unfair. The Muslim deity clearly does the latter, in that he does not allow deformity to happen, rather he actively brings it about (for there is no such thing as an original sin which drastically changed the constitution of humans and which could therefore lead to physical and/or mental deformity without the active participation of the Muslim deity within the Islamic world-view). The Muslim deity has orchestrated circumstances so that from birth, some innocent individuals already experience the effects of certain evils (such as being born disabled, deformed, etc.). While it is the case that there is the possibility that granting all this, some individuals may truly come to love Allah and this is certainly well and good. Yet, for those who would resent him because of this fact, no charge could be laid against them for the injustice lies squarely with Allah. The test is unfair when one is set up to fail from the very beginning.

Another example would be that of homosexuality. In general, Muslims believe that Allah does not cause people to be born homosexuals in part because to then blame them for succumbing to the very desires he embedded within them would be unjust. Yet According to Islam, Allah regularly causes individuals to be born with extreme deformities for no other reason than to test them and yet if they resent him for this injustice the Muslim deity still considers himself to be in a position to judge these very people. Evidently, the problem with Islam is that if the Muslim is at all to be consistent, they would realize that Allah is also the originator of evil and regularly punishes people for what often stems from the very evil that he brought into being.

In light of the above, all which the rational individual can say of the Muslim deity is to echo the words of the Old Testament, “You have been weighed on the scales and found wanting” (Daniel 5:27).

Unwilling Sacrifice:

Jesus, as we are so insistently told, offered himself voluntarily to God the Father and was made the scapegoat for the sins of all humanity, provided, of course, they believed in him. But when the time of acceptance of his wish approaches nigh and at last the glimmer of hope for sinful humanity is beginning to appear like the dawn of a new day, as we turn to Jesus expecting to observe his joy, his happiness and his ecstasy at this most eventful moment of human history, how profoundly disappointed and manifestly disillusioned we are. Instead of finding a Jesus impatiently awaiting the hour of jubilation what we see instead is a Jesus weeping and crying and praying and beseeching God the Father to take away the bitter cup of death from him. — Hasan

There are a few things that are incorrect with the above and before we can continue with the rest of the article we must first place things in the right perspective. The author claims that we are to be disillusioned by the fact that the Christ displayed such terror, such aversion even, to the events which would soon transpire. Starting from the end of the above citation and working our way up, we are treated to the author’s first mistake. He incorrectly identifies the cup which Christ was so reluctant to drink as the “bitter cup of death.” Now, to the author’s credit, the cup held out by the Father to his Son in one aspect truly was a bitter cup of death yet to term it merely as such betrays a fundamental ignorance of the realities of Gethsemane (as if the Saviour shrank back from mere death) and the agony of Jesus Christ. It is only such a profound misunderstanding that could ever lead one to be disappointed by Christ’s lack of a happy-go-lucky, uninhibitedly joyous disposition at the prospect of soon having to drink from the cup of God’s wrath. That, in fact, is the proper name for this cup and in simply naming it properly one begins to see the terror that ought to come with it. In other passages, this cup is described as follows:

“If any man worship the beast and his image, and receive his mark in his forehead, or in his hand, the same shall drink of the wine of the wrath of God, which is poured out without mixture into the cup of his indignation; and he shall be tormented with fire and brimstone in the presence of the holy angels, and in the presence of the Lamb.” — Rev. 14:9-10 KJV

From the above we understand that this cup is the very wrath of God, unmixed with pity, nor diluted by grace but it is the full measure of the anger of God against all manner of ungodliness. It is a punishment of unimaginable torment that is applied to the individual’s very soul. The imagery used in the Bible to describe the wrath of God is meant to illicit fear at the reality of hell and within this cup was contained the full payment, that is, the full wrath of God which was reserved for all those whom Christ voluntarily suffered for. Now knowing that the content of this cup was not merely death on a cross but rather the full anger, the full wrath, the full indignation of a holy God, what would one expect to feel?

At this point I will say that the author is being deceiving in his statements above because I can guarantee the reader that in reality, he believes that the terror which Christ felt in Gethsemane to be the appropriate response considering the circumstances. This is because, as a Muslim, he would agree that terror at being punished by God is the most appropriate emotion to feel. One might ask him whether a person should be terrified at the prospect of being subjected to punishment by God in hell or whether they should laugh it off and go on with their daily life feeling wholly indifferent? He would certainly agree with me that terror, weeping, crying, and praying would be the most appropriate course of action. If the same is true for the suffering of Christ on the cross, how then would he pretend that the reader should be disillusioned by the gospel narrative? Aversion is the most appropriate action to take and it would be absolutely disgraceful and an insult to God himself if Jesus had behaved anything like the author wished because it would betray a sincere lack of understanding as to what exactly was going on and would make light of the entire issue of God rightfully punishing sin. In the above quote, the author displays a very low view of God and would like us to make light of, and to merely gloss over the fact that God himself was about to judge the world in Christ. The individual who would be disillusioned by the response of Christ towards the wrath of God is not pious, rather he would that Christ had sinned by not conducting himself in the appropriate manner concerning what God was about to do in regards to sin.

Furthermore, the author seems to insinuate that seeing as the Christ displayed such terror at the coming agony, he was somehow involuntarily coerced into dying on the cross. I believe that Jesus undertook his suffering voluntarily but Hasan disagrees (on the basis that Jesus displayed such aversion to his suffering) so now we have to ask ourselves who in fact is correct? To be sure both our positions are attested to by scripture: that Jesus wasn’t especially excited at experiencing the wrath of God is recorded in Matt. 26:39, Luke 22:42, Mark 14:36 yet that Jesus voluntarily underwent his passion is recorded in Matt. 16:21-23, Matt. 26:53, John 10:17-18, John 12:31-33 and in many more places throughout scripture. That said, perhaps the better question to ask would be whether one can both volunteer for a matter and yet feel aversion at the task, all at the same time?

Reason tells us that this is quite possible and one does not need to posit a hopeless contradiction between the two or opt for one scenario and thereby completely disregard the other. It is a simple fact that many people would be willing to give their lives for their loved ones, yet one doubts that they would be particularly excited by the thought of their suffering. During the hour of their agony, would it not be possible for them to wish that there was another way? If this is so, would it then put into question the fact that they voluntarily offered their life for their loved one? Of course the answer is no because the dread of suffering and the dedication to go through with the suffering are not mutually exclusive. Hasan however, would ask us to disregard all of the above and simply believe that Jesus was coerced into dying on the cross (nevermind his repeated claims to having come for just this purpose or his foreknowledge of the fact) because he was anything but ecstatic at the coming punishment. It goes without saying that this position is wholly unreasonable and does nothing to harmonize all the evidence that is presented (while my position does take into account all of the factors, his does not and largely ignores them altogether). One must remind the author that there is a time for everything (Ecc. 3:1-8) and at times, it is far more appropriate to display terror than to display joy.

Yet there is more to be said concerning Gethsemane. Up until now I have conducted my response as if the words “take this cup away from me” meant that Christ was asking to be saved and effectively skip his ordeal and that is not at all what I understand from this verse. To be sure enough, I sincerely believe that Jesus was in deep agony concerning the events which were to transpire—as he should have been for no other response was more appropriate—but I do not think that he was asking God if he could forgo drinking from the cup of his wrath seeing as to pay for the sins of his people was his entire reason for becoming man (Matt. 1:21)!

²³ Jesus replied, “The hour has come for the Son of Man to be glorified. ²⁴ Very truly I tell you, unless a kernel of wheat falls to the ground and dies, it remains only a single seed. But if it dies, it produces many seeds. [...] ²⁷ “Now my soul is troubled, and what shall I say? ‘Father, save me from this hour’? No, it was for this very reason I came to this hour. ²⁸ Father, glorify your name!” Then a voice came from heaven, “I have glorified it, and will glorify it again.” ²⁹ The crowd that was there and heard it said it had thundered; others said an angel had spoken to him. ³⁰ Jesus said, “This voice was for your benefit, not mine. ³¹ Now is the time for judgment on this world; now the prince of this world will be driven out. ³² And I, when I am lifted up from the earth, will draw all people to myself.” ³³ He said this to show the kind of death he was going to die. — John 10:23-24, 27-33 NIV

Notice that in the above Christ derisively asks whether he should ask to be saved from the hour of suffering and then claims that he could not do so for the hour of his suffering was the very reason for why he was born. Even the analogy concerning the kernel of wheat shows that the Christ viewed his death as being absolutely necessary! So then in what manner are we to understand his request towards the Father in Gethsemane? Perhaps the following explains it best:

A third possibility is to take “this cup” as an image of punishment, as it is in the Old Testament. Rather than asking to get out of the torment of the cross, Jesus is looking forward to the time when the punishment for sin will be over and he will be restored to complete fellowship with the Father. Craig Blaising notes that Jesus applied Isaiah 53:12 to himself before going to the garden, and suggests that Isaiah 51:19-22 may hold the key to interpreting the desire to have the cup removed. In Isaiah, the cup of God’s wrath is taken away from the people after they have experienced it. They received the punishment in full, but afterwards the cup is removed and they experience the blessings of the Lord in the Kingdom. Rather than asking to avoid the crucifixion, Jesus is praying that after he “drinks from the cup of wrath,” he have that cup taken away so that he can enjoy fellowship again.

Blaising says:

The implication for Jesus’ prayer is this: As in this passage, where God will remove the cup of his wrath from his people after they have drunk it, so Jesus prays that the cup of God’s wrath for sin, which he drinks for all, will in the same way be removed from his hand by the Father after he has drunk it (335). — Reading Acts

This interpretation of the words of Christ is made all the more forceful when one understands that Jesus ushered his ministry by quoting from Isaiah (compare Isaiah 61:1-2 with Luke 4:16-21) and the fact that Jesus was looking forward to returning to his previous state of glory. The very glory that he shared together with the Father before the world was created (John 17:4-5)! If we comprehend things in this manner, then we would see that it fits in exactly with the punishment and blessing motif of Isaiah. Yet not only that, but it fits in perfectly with the hymn to Christ in Philippians 2:5-11. Once more abasement follows exultation and it is only after having been abased that Christ returns to his seat of glory. It is this return to glory that the Christ asks for.

It is said in the Old Testament that an imposter who attributes things to God which He had never said, would be hanged on a tree and die upon it an accursed death [(Deuteronomy 21:22–23)]. [...] Jesus knew that if this happened, the Jews would celebrate with ecstasy and proclaim him to be an imposter whose falsehood had finally been proved beyond a shadow of doubt on the authority of the divine Scriptures. This was the reason why he was so anxious to escape the bitter cup of death; not out of cowardice but out of fear that his people would be misled and would fail to recognise his truth if he died upon the cross. — Hasan

Once more the author betrays his lack of understanding by implying that it was the cross which so terrified Christ rather than the unbridled wrath of God that he would soon experience. In fact, the author cannot support the above words through scripture because we have repeated instances wherein Christ plainly announces that he came into the world so as to become a sacrifice for sin and reconcile the world to God. The fact that Jewish law claims that whoever is hung on a tree is cursed poses no problem for the Christian because this is precisely what the Bible claims of Jesus (Galatians 3:13). We must understand that the wrath of God is the same as the curse of God and for Christ to accept this punishment is to accept the curse. It only follows that God would punish that which he has cursed. Yet the prophets themselves declared that the Messiah would in fact bear our sins upon himself and God would punish him for us all (Isaiah 53).

⁴ Surely he took up our pain
and bore our suffering,
yet we considered him punished by God,
stricken by him, and afflicted.
⁵ But he was pierced for our transgressions,
he was crushed for our iniquities;
the punishment that brought us peace was on him,
and by his wounds we are healed.

[...]

¹⁰ Yet it was the LORD’s will to crush him and cause him to suffer, and though the LORD makeshis life an offering for sin,

[...]

¹¹ After he has suffered,
he will see the light of life and be satisfied;
by his knowledgemy righteous servant will justify many,
and he will bear their iniquities. — Isaiah 53:4-5; 10 NIV

The above words were written some 600 years before Christ yet describe the life and sacrifice of Jesus so perfectly. Contrary to the incredibly vague prophecies that Muslims have to read into the words of God in order to find Muhammad in the bible, the prophecies about Jesus are incredibly clear. I mean who else (more specifically, what other Jew) in the history of the world has it been claimed of that he died for the sins of others? Who else has it been claimed of that in his suffering and in the shedding of his blood would he reconcile the many to God? Notice that the text says that the individual would be pierced for our transgressions and by his punishment we would be healed. What other figure in the history of the world does the above describe if not Christ? This is certainly a problem that the Muslim, Jew and the world has to come to terms with given that at the very least, the above is dated hundreds of years before the birth of Jesus yet details his life and ministry so perfectly even to the point where it claims that the very nation to whom these things were revealed to would not believe it (Isaiah 53:1). I would encourage Hasan to read the chapter in full.

Who was Sacrificed?

One is compelled to wonder about the relationship of the man in Jesus with the inherited propensity to commit sin, common to all the progeny of Adam and Eve. At best one can bring oneself to believe that in the duality of the ‘Divine Son’ and the man occupying the same body, it was only the ‘Divine Son’ who was innocent. But what about the man living alongside him. [...] This scenario will not be complete without presenting Jesus the ‘Son of God’, dying, not so unselfishly after all, for the sake of humanity but his prime concern might have been for his half brother, the man in him.— Ibid.

Again the reader is privy to Hasan’s lack of understanding in that Jesus did not inherit the propensity to sin seeing as it is passed through the father. The author goes on to posit a distinction within Christ between the man and the God and no such distinction can be made. There is only one Christ. Two natures in one person and not two persons in one person. Also given that we have established that the Christ was sinless, we need not concern ourselves with the author’s baseless conjectures.

The Dilemma of Jesus

‘Eloi, Eloi, lama sabachtani?’—which means, ‘My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?’>

-Matthew 27:46

One must notice that it was not agony alone expressed in that cry but obviously there was mingled with it an element of surprise, bordering on horror. — Ibid.

It would seem that Hasan has once again displayed his lack of biblical knowledge. He claims that the Christ was somehow surprised by the events of the crucifixion, as if somehow things had gone horribly wrong and he had been deceived by God. To this end he quotes from Matt. 27:46 yet little does he know that those very words which Jesus spoke were to point his audience towards the truth that his crucifixion was foretold in the Bible! The words, “My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?” are actually the opening line of Psalm 22—written hundreds of years before the birth of Christ. Before I continue it must be mentioned that the Bible hasn’t always been neatly divided into numbered chapters and verses etc. so it often occurred that entire sections were known by their opening lines and this is exactly what we find in Psalm 22. It contains specific prophecies about Christ and the circumstances surrounding his death, both his abasement and subsequent exultation. At this point, it would prove worthwhile for us to take a look at this prophetic psalm:

Psalm 22:7 and 8
(7) All they that see me, they mock me. They hurl insults shaking their heads saying,
(8) “He trusts in the Lord; let the Lord rescue him. Let him deliver him, since he delights in him.”

Matthew 27:41-43
(41) In the same way the chief priests, the teachers of the law and the elders mocked him.
(42) “He saved others,” they said, “but he can’t save himself! He’s the king of Israel! Let him come down now from the cross, and we will believe in him.
(43) He trusts in God. Let God rescue him now if he wants him, for he said, ‘I am the Son of God.”

—————

Psalm 22:16-18
(16) Dogs have surrounded me, a band of evil men has encircled me, they have pierced my hands and my feet.
(17) I can count all my bones; people stare and gloat over me.
(18) They divide my garments among them and cast lots for my clothing.

John 19:23-24

²³ When the soldiers crucified Jesus, they took his clothes, dividing them into four shares, one for each of them, with the undergarment remaining. This garment was seamless, woven in one piece from top to bottom. ²⁴ “Let’s not tear it,” they said to one another. “Let’s decide by lot who will get it.”

The Psalmist then goes on to describe the eventual triumph of the Lord and how the one who previously suffered will sing God’s praise. From the above it is more than obvious that Hasan has profoundly misunderstood the atonement and the suffering of Christ.

More can always be said on the subjects of forgiveness and/or the atonement.